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This dissertation explores the politics of fiscal decentralization in comparative 
perspective. Case studies of Argentina and Spain are used to provide insights into the way that 
the distribution of institutional and economic resources in multitiered polities shapes the extent 
to which the policy of transferring revenue and revenue authority to subnational governments 
can be exploited for political gain. This approach draws attention to the political conditions that 
inhibit the coordination of fiscal reform efforts between the different levels of government and 
perpetuate the financing of subnational spending with revenue collected by the national 
government. This political context undermines national fiscal adjustment efforts and leads to 
economic catastrophes such as those experienced in Argentina throughout the last two decades. 
Specifically, this study uses statistical analyses and empirical institutional theory to show how 
patterns of territorial representation and bargaining strategies hindered revenue decentralization 
in Argentina but advanced it in Spain. 
The research suggests, first, coalition-building goals drive national executives in 
Argentina to reach out legislators of the opposition by means of allocating larger shares of 
federal transfers to the provinces the latter belong to. However, all else equal, legislatively 
overrepresented, i.e. economically marginal and sparsely populated, provinces will be targeted 
first. Second, the increasing role of regionalist parties in Spanish national politics and their 
acceptance in joint-policy mechanisms tilts the allocation of chosen federal transfers slightly in 
 iv
favor of economically developed and densely populated autonomous communities, which are 
generally governed by regionalist forces. Third, whereas Argentine subnational interests are 
“locked-in” at the Senate level and intergovernmental negotiations are conducted bilaterally, 
open-ended institutional arrangements and a relatively impotent senate in Spain boosted the 
redressing of regional concerns through informal intergovernmental fora and increasing 
multilateral collaboration Fourth, such differences in patterns of institutional representation and 
bargaining strategies explain the paucity of fiscal decentralization in Argentina and its relative 
progress in Spain. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
What determines the magnitude of decentralization in a country? This question has become 
highly topical at the light of recent developments in both developed and developing countries 
that have increased the interest in what might loosely be called “decentralized forms of 
government”. The preference for decentralization is often articulated by political scientists in 
terms of its advantages with regard to the transference of powers and functions to lower levels of 
government. Also, inspired by some economic theories of federalism, devolution of fiscal 
responsibilities is promoted to bolster economic development and the preservation of markets. 
Adding to the academic interest in decentralization is the fact that virtually all nations – federal 
or otherwise – have more than one tier of government, each with its own set of political and 
fiscal functions. Like democratization and human rights protection, decentralization is often seen 
as a necessary component of political development. However, despite the emergence of a 
substantial body of research on the economic and political effects of decentralization, the 
literature has been more silent on treating decentralization as an outcome to be explained. 
 
In fact, we know very little about the political determinants of decentralization. Implicit in much 
of the literature is the assumption that federal states are more fiscally and politically 
decentralized than unitary systems. However, and even if we admit that federalism involves 
institutional mechanisms that preserve significant and staying powers of subnational units, state 
structures have limited explanatory value because of their predominantly invariant nature. Not to 
mention that oftentimes local governments in federal systems (i.e., Austria and Argentina) are 
worse off than their analogues in unitary countries (i.e., Nordic countries and Colombia) because 
in the former municipalities tend to be subject to state-level or middle tier of governments, which 
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 by nature are resource maximizers.  Moreover, the political praxis of some federal states, like 
Mexico and Venezuela, is normally more centralized than that of unitary ones. Thus, it becomes 
apparent that extant taxonomic exercises treating federalism as a way to measure decentralization 
do not account for the fact that whereas the former entails formal and resilient institutional 
incentives, the latter is a dynamic phenomenon. Constitutional design and institutional veto 
points may account for initial levels of decentralization in a country, but they cannot anticipate 
the degree, patterns, and pace of decentralization.  
 
1.1 Why Decentralization? 
The study of decentralization has been high on the agenda of contemporary political science. 
This should come as no surprise given the fact that nearly all countries worldwide have 
experimented with one or another type of decentralization project. Their motivations are diverse. 
First, territorial differentials in economic developments have been identified as causing 
decentralization. Based on core-periphery analysis, this literature hypothesizes that poor regions 
would promote decentralization to increase their say in policies that might improve their destiny 
(Horowitz 1985; Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Another category of explanations suggests that 
decentralization results from an adverse reaction of societal and governmental actors to 
economic and political centralization. While in principle there seem to exist no major differences 
between democratic and authoritarian experiences in this regard, democratization processes 
invigorate decentralization and coexist with it (Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Nickson 1995; 
Panizza 1999). Third, one argument asserts that country size and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity 
are the strongest predictors of decentralization (Oates 1972). Last, decision-makers in developing 
nations believed that decentralization will quench advanced capitalist countries’ concern with 
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 development and good governance. As the confidence in large-scale undertakings eroded, 
decentralization was congenial with different micro-level projects sponsored by the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Community/Union (Manor 1999).  
 
Albeit effective in illustrating starting points, these explanations are partial, at best. The 
hypothesis attributing decentralization to demands from poor regions fails to account for the fact 
that relatively richer regions (Catalonia, Lombardia, among others) have exerted greater pressure 
on the center for fiscal and political decentralization (Keating 1988). These better-off regions 
have exploited their advantageous position to limit redistributive policies that have come about 
in parallel to state centralization. The explanation focusing on democratization does not fully 
capture why successive generations of political leaders, both civilans and generals, have sought 
to shift their countries back and forth along the decentralization continuum. In fact, far-reaching 
decentralization has occurred under non-elected governments; such as in the cases of Argentina 
in the 1970s, Brazil in the 1980s and China in the 1990s. Moreover, the democratization cum 
decentralization hypothesis does not tell us much about cases where decentralizing reforms 
preceded transitions to democracy, as shown by the Brazilian case. Structuralist explanations 
based on country size and ethnicity fall short of explaining variation in levels of decentralization 
among comparable countries like Belgium and Switzerland, considering that the former 
considerably more centralized than the latter (Watts 1999). Last, decisions to decentralize by 
national governments did not take into account serious reservations in donor agencies about the 
dangers of decentralization, especially to macroeconomic management (Prud’homme 1995; 
Tanzi 1996). 
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 1.1.1 The Theoretical Argument 
 
The argument of this dissertation begins with a rather simple observation that decentralization is 
neither irreversible nor inevitable. It is a process of transformation of political and fiscal 
relationships between central and subnational governments that inherently involves strategic 
choices made by politicians. Consistent with this political nature of decentralization, we 
therefore emphasize the role played by dominant actors in the process. As happens with other 
policy arenas, presidents and governors may endorse decentralization of authority to bolster their 
overall position subsequently. What looks oftentimes like a blunt surrendering of power at first 
glance, becomes much more intelligible when it is juxtaposed with expectations about future 
gains.  
 
Why, then, would central governments relinquish fiscal authority to lower levels? At least in 
Latin America, several studies show that decentralization is not so much a goal in itself as a 
means to an end. In Mexico, major municipal reforms were undertaken during the 1980s at the 
light of the weakening position of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) vis-à-vis 
opposition parties that began to win elections at the state level (Rodriguez 1997: 140-45). 
Brazilian legislators have passed decentralizing policies oftentimes because state governors, who 
are powerful political figures controlling the career options of the former at the district level, 
demanded more fiscal leverage (Souza 1997). President Carlos Menem of Argentina has 
skillfully launched decentralizing and subsequent re-centralizing reforms that resulted from 
bilateral negotiations between the national executive and provinces. This means that Menem 
used fiscal decentralization to play off some of the provinces against each other, favoring those 
whose governors were willing to support his attempt to compete for re-election (Eaton 2001; 
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 Falletti 2000). This approach of resorting to decentralization as a politically expedient instrument 
is not foreign to West European experiences as well. Comparative research of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom shows that pace and forms of fiscal 
decentralization are basically determined by the structure of partisan competition at the regional 
level. When regionalist parties compete against each other, demanding further fiscal prerogatives 
becomes a necessary condition to be seen as a credible representative of state-level interests (Van 
Houten 1999). Even when top-down styles are more conspicuous, political factors are still 
decisive. A comparison of the policy and practices of President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher 
administrations highlights that, beyond their profound ideological similarities, the former 
advanced neoliberal prescriptions by adopting the decentralizing New Federalist policy whereas 
the latter has pushed centralization to unprecedented levels in Britain (Rhodes 1992; Wright 
1998: 39). These examples suggest that decentralization processes are highly malleable and are 
very much dictated by apriori expectations of protecting elites’ own power positions and policy 
expediency. 
 
That having been said, while extant research emphasize the impact of specific institutional 
arrangements on decisions to decentralize or otherwise, the role of contingent and changing 
scenarios is under-theorized and still remains elusive. We attempt to remedy this deficiency by 
focusing my analysis beyond formal institutional incentives per se. As said, whether the structure 
of the state is federal or unitary sheds little light on the nature of decentralization, as this is a 
dynamic feature of both systems. Some studies, however, have addressed this concern by 
emphasizing the context of “divided government” as the major parameter shaping the evolution 
of fiscal relations between levels of government. Evidence from US states shows that partisan 
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 configurations in Congress are crucial in shaping fiscal outcomes and their territorial 
implications (Alt and Lowry 1994; McCubbins 1991). According to this body of scholarship, 
when control of the executive and legislative branches of government is divided, the party that 
controls the legislature may support decentralization aiming at restricting budgetary and political 
power of the chief executive.  
 
However, when data from Argentine provinces are used, it is shown that an expansionary bias in 
provincial expenditures caused by the detachment of tax and spending decisions is far more 
influential than divided government (Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi 2000). This result is highly 
unexpected given relatively high levels of party discipline in Argentine legislatures. A parallel 
case of strong party discipline enforced in the Parliament is Spain (Gunther 1989; Sanchez de 
Dios 1999), where the incidence of partisan color in legislature on decentralization is eclipsed by 
the predominance of intergovernmental transfers as the main source of revenues for regional 
governments (Sole-Vilanoba 1990). Accordingly, a “deficit bias” and its concomitant 
exacerbation of individualistic and non-cooperative behavior are held to be major driving forces 
in cross-national processes of fiscal decentralization (Imman and Rubinfeld 1996). This 
distortion, in turn, denotes a structural limitation of fiscal systems that provides a normative basis 
for levels of decentralization. While the Argentine and Spanish are just two among many other 
cases (e.g. Brazil, Germany) in which state-level administrations have every reason to increase 
their spending, as costs of decentralized provision are borne by other jurisdictions, both deserve 
independent study because they provide an ideal laboratory to explore the effect of said “race to 
the bottom” component of fiscal decentralization. This is so because they tackled this 
predicament differently, despite the presence of strong rent-seeking distributional coalitions at 
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 the subnational level and their sharing potentially significant political variables affecting the 
unfolding of decentralization. In Argentina, two fiscal pacts (1992 and 1993) negotiated by the 
national and provincial governments facilitated a partial reversal of fiscal decentralization that 
took place in the late 1980s. Further, even in policy domains that were formally under the clout 
of provincial officials such as education, federal authorities preserved a great deal of authority 
(Murillo 1999). The Spanish experience shows that when certain conditions, such certain level of 
cross-jurisdictional coordination, are present , it becomes very difficult for central authorities to 
slow down decentralizing reforms, once these were set in motion. 
 
1.1.1.1 Goals of this Dissertation 
 
In focusing on the Argentine and Spanish experiences with fiscal decentralization, my 
dissertation seeks to make several contributions. First, it questions the applicability of normative 
views of fiscal federalism, and their concomitant neglect of the political framework in which 
fiscal decisions are taken. While the normative literature on fiscal federalism (Tiebout 1956; 
Buchanan and Musgrave 1999; Oates 1999) is correct in its assessment of the benefits of 
interregional fiscal competition, it fails to account for the role of bureaucrats and politicians in 
generating suboptimal fiscal outcomes. In an often cited study, Scharpf (1988) claims that 
decentralization entails a decision-making system in which no single decision-maker is able to 
tackle problems alone. This so called “joint decision trap” is held to be a major factor explaining 
policy deadlock in federal systems like Germany and Switzerland (but, see Peters 1997). This 
phenomenon, however, has less of an influence in cases where the central government, which 
controls most tax revenue sources, determines the final amount of transfers that is subject to 
political bargaining. The Argentine and Spanish cases, accordingly, offer a distinct federal 
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 configuration less conducive to competitive bargaining systems, allowing us to analyze an 
alternative manner in which decentralization may unfold. Drawing on Scharpf’s intuition as to 
the effect of political interferences in fiscal policies, my study maps out an analytical framework 
that may explain why and when uncoordinated action between levels of government leads to 
jurisdictional intrusion and hence to centralizing and decentralizing moves. By providing the 
empirical details of these developments, this dissertation hopes to provide a building block for a 
positive theory of decentralization. 
 
Second, this dissertation links the study of decentralization to the literature of institutions and 
political parties explicitly. For the most part, extant research on parties largely ignores the 
“territorial dimension” (but, see Ames 1994). This deficiency renders an important gap in our 
understanding of partisan considerations in intergovernmental fiscal bargaining.  The policy of 
transferring revenue to state governments is by all means a political issue, because the amount of 
resources granted to subnational governments will determine their viability and success. How 
politicians approach this arena of political contestation is not divorced from developments in the 
electoral cycle. In turn, the analytical framework employed in this study suggests that 
subnational governments’ ability to negotiate decentralizing reforms depends on the 
representation of region-wide parties in legislature, on whether members of the same party 
govern the central and regional administrations and on partisan distribution of seats in 
legislature. While controlling for those economic and socio-demographic factors which 
normative views on fiscal federalism hold as crucial, our explicit inclusion of regional 
differences in political bargaining power can help us advance toward a political theory of 
decentralization.  
8 
  
Third, and more implicitly, this dissertation addresses some institutional biases in the 
comparative study of federalism. The mere existence of formal federal structures does not mean 
that they are effective in practice. Administrative decentralization in Argentina has not 
attenuated the centripetal impact of strong mechanisms of centralized control (Botana 1993). For 
instance, drawing on, and abusing of, a US-like constitutional clause by which the federal 
government can intervene in its member states to guarantee the republican form of regime, 
Argentine federal authorities have constrained governors politically by using federal 
interventions according to their discretion and convenience. By the same token, countries lacking 
formal federal and full-fledged cooperative institutions may nonetheless animate a system of 
multiple interacting governments under conditions where subnational administrations make the 
final decisions in their own sphere of political authority, a parameter which according to Riker 
(1964) is the most prominent feature of federal systems. The Spanish case is enlightening in this 
respect because the Constitutional Court has revoked in 1983 the Organic Law for the 
Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (LOAPA), which established that the national 
government could enact “basic” legislation and norms in domains reserved for subnational 
governments, and that in case of discrepancy with regional legislation, national laws would 
prevail.1 Let me also just mention how one of the most recently cited and discussed theories of 
federalism – Weingast’s model of market-preserving federalism – juxtaposes de facto federal 
18th-century England to the US formal federal system (Weingast 1995) to argue that the legal 
                                                 
1   There are some studies even arguing that “there are circumstances when the stability of 
decentralization equilibrium is as robust in unitary as in federal states”. In their article on vertical 
competition in Italy (i.e., a relatively decentralized yet unitary country), Breton and Fraschini 
(2003: 58) claim that constitutional arrangements and practices make arbitrary repossessions of 
powers by the central government unlikely. 
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 system may be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the maintenance of a decentralized 
federal framework. While ignoring self-designated labels can sometimes be analytically 
misleading, a theoretically-informed use of “functional equivalences” (Dogan and Pelassy 1990: 
37-44) may help uncover important patterns of contrasts and similarities in comparative research. 
Beyond the different regional contexts and governmental structures of Argentina and Spain, the 
presence and persistence of strong rent-seeking distributional coalitions at the subnational level 
in these countries yields an appropriate empirical background to study the politics of 
decentralization. 
 
Finally, the topic of this dissertation zooms in on a problem that is more than of exclusively 
academic interest. As we write these paragraphs, Argentina is undergoing extreme fiscal 
difficulties, after several years of economic reforms and growth. Whereas during previous crises 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has in one way or another bailed out irresponsible fiscal 
behavior of Argentinean decision-makers, this time it has made changes aimed at a radical 
restructuring of Argentine fiscal coparticipation system the most decisive condition for extending 
additional loans to Argentina. The IMF stance is well reflected in a recent quote by President 
Bush saying that, “we are hoping that Argentina will make the necessary reforms, the though 
decisions necessary to earn the confidence of some of these international financial institutions. 
The country itself is going to have to make some though calls, starting with reforming the 
relationship between the provinces and their budgets and the central governments” (The 
Financial Times, March 21, 2002, p.1).  
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 1.1.1.1.1 A SHORT NOTE ON METHODS 
Methodologically, this study attempts to improve on some shortcomings in the literature on 
decentralization. A large part of extant research is either based on one country studies, which are 
valuable in providing rich empirical materials but often fail to travel very well cross-nationally 
(Rodriguez 1997) or on large “N” datasets that often times conflate countries that are not 
reasonably similar, constraining their usefulness as road maps to study decentralization (Davoodi 
and Zou 1998; Panizza 1999; Garret and Rodden 2000). Furthermore, cross-country studies 
employ variables such as openness to trade (Fisman and Gatti 2002) and levels of corporatism 
(Castles 1999) that have little within-country variation, forcing researchers to use average values 
often based on judgmental calls of data analysts. By studying a more limited, hence controlled, 
number of cases and using subnational level data, my dissertation renders a research design more 
propitious to develop “middle range” (LaPalombara 1968) theorizing. Although suggesting that 
careful attention is needed to avoid “lulling the researcher into a false sense of security”, Peters 
(1998: 35) claims that a theoretically-informed use of subnational data can be a good antidote to 
minimize problems of extraneous variance.2 Albeit until recently under-utilized in comparative 
research, with the exception of works on US politics, the use of subnational level statistics 
increases the number of observations and minimizes the effect of confounding influences derived 
from structural commonalities at the national level (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 52, 220).  
 
More specifically, the research design used in this study combines two comparative strategies. 
On the one hand, it makes use of within-nation comparisons of subnational units in Argentina 
                                                 
2  Peters’ cautionary note is exemplified, for instance, by the fact that Southern Spanish 
Autonomous Communities (AC) like Extremadura, which is one of the poorest in the country, 
has more in common with Argentine provinces than with AC in northern Spain. 
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 and Spain. There is an extensive literature indicating that this strategy facilitates systematic 
comparative analysis, controlling for ecological, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions (Key 
1949; Lijphart 1971). The other strategy resorts to comparisons of subnational units of non-
contiguous nations to minimize the distorting effects of diffusion at the national level. Because 
subnational units in a country are often interconnected and subjected to parallel political and 
macroeconomic processes, they can hardly be considered to be independent from one another. 
This interconnectedness among cases (i.e., “observations”) hinders the accomplishment of 
independent tests of a theoretical proposition.3  
 
In this spirit, I have constructed two datasets, one for Argentina and the other for Spain, which 
include a battery of electoral, economic and socio-demographic variables for a time-series 
analysis. The time-span varies for both countries and it is basically based on data availability. 
These statistics are triangulated with qualitative information from policy informants and 
secondary sources that I collected during my dissertation field work in Buenos Aires and Madrid. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  This dynamics, known as “Galton’s problem”, suggests that subunits drawn from the same 
political systems are susceptible to diffusion effects (policy, migration, etc.) from which it is 
hard to sort out causes of variance in political phenomena. While “Galton’s problem” can also 
involve institutional/policy diffusion across entire regions, such as the pervasiveness of 
presidentialism in Latin America (Peters 1998: 42) or cross-regional diffusion, epitomized in the 
adoption of neoliberal reforms in developing nations in the 1980s, comparing subnational units 
drawn from nations subjected to different regional contexts such Argentina and Spain can 
maximize independence among cases. For instance, Spain is subjected to regional processes of 
political and economic integration far more complex and deeper than those affecting Argentina 
as a member of Mercosur.  
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 1.1.1.1.1.1 Plan of the Dissertation 
The study proceeds in the following way: Chapter 2 uses empirical institutional analysis to assess 
the effect of patterns of territorial representation on fiscal decentralization policies. It focuses 
first on legislative-level territorial representation and its effect on intergovernmental fiscal 
outcomes. Also, it explores the conditions leading to bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental 
bargaining, which, we will argue are part and parcel of the tension between territorial distribution 
of political influence and economic resources. 
 
From said theoretical discussion, I distill several hypotheses to explain variation, both spatial and 
temporal, in the allocation of federal/central government grants to subnational governments in 
Argentina (chapter 3) and Spain (chapter 4). In these chapters, the dependent variables are not 
the lump sums grants transferred to their respective regional administrations but, rather, the 
apportionment of earmarked transfers; in particular, those transfers that are held to be susceptible 
to high levels of political manipulation by secondary sources and policy informants. After 
conducting panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) regression analyses with pooled data from 
each country, cross-sectional analysis is conducted to explain the inter-regional distribution of 
transfers. Subsequently, qualitative data are used to unpack the process of decentralization in 
both countries through more detailed empirical information. These data allow me to pinpoint the 
impact of different electoral junctures and power configurations more systematically. By just 
looking at pooled data it is hard to disentangle the effect of strategic considerations on (de) 
centralizing moves. To illustrate this point let me just refer to an often-cited argument in some 
literatures on decentralization (Willis, Garman and Haggard 1999) suggesting that, the weaker 
the central government’s position, the more pressed it is to deepen fiscal decentralization and to 
include a broader group of parties. However, when the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) took 
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 power after its landslide victory in the 1982 national elections, it set in motion a decade-long 
policy of decentralization aiming at the extension of health and education competencies to all 
regions, regardless of their executive’s partisan color. This seemingly paradoxical move was not 
a mere embrace of decentralizing principles but rather it was party aimed at diluting the political 
bargaining effect of the Basques and Catalans – both rich, ruled by regionalist parties, and 
demanding radical policies of decentralization – by integrating other regions in a broad coalition 
with the national government (Agranoff and Gallarin 1997: 14-15).  That is to say, the PSOE 
“decentralized to deter further decentralization”. 
 
Chapter 5 begins by mapping out the sources of politicization of fiscal decentralization.  The 
main argument set forth in this discussion is that except for those fiscal arrangements that are 
constitutionally binding (and not coincidentally only few of them are!), national and subnational 
politicians have a great margin of influence as to whether to enhance or damage decentralization 
policies. More generally, this chapter shows the importance of including inter-state conflicts and 
cooperation to explain decentralization processes. This seemingly obvious caveat becomes 
crucial at the light of bipolar accounts, such as Riker’s seminal and pioneering work on 
federalism, characterizing the conflict as one between a central government, on the one hand, 
and the constituent state governments un bloc, on the other.  
 
Chapter 6 begins with a concluding summary of the dissertation’s findings and then turns to the 
implications of these results. If the theoretical predictions of this study are correct, 
decentralization may entail more than “preserving markets” or localizing decisions to enhance 
ethical standards. Decentralization provides dominant political actors a unique opportunity to 
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 “reinvent” fiscal intergovernmental relations to their advantage. Then, can countries escape this 
apparent subterfuge? Is federalism, insofar as it facilitates political organization at the 
subnational level, to be blamed? And last, if decentralization policies are no more than elegant 
ways to dole out politically-motivated side-payments, can they be analyzed using the same 
theoretical and analytical approaches to explain other policy areas?  
 
Finally, a detailed explanation of the terminology used in this dissertation is provided in 
Appendix 1. As can be seen above, for instance, “national” and “central” governments are used 
interchangeably. Also, federations use different term to label their subnational and constituent 
units. An Argentine “province” is equivalent to an “autnomous community” in Spain, to a Swiss 
“canton”, and to a US “state”. A full list of terms and detailed information is then offered in said 
appendix. 
 
1.1.1.1.1.1.1 Major Findings 
 
This dissertation’s central analytical objective is to find a framework for understanding and 
explaining the politics of decentralization. The precise field of empirical problems on which we 
focus to test the conceptual framework is that of politics in the territorial determination of 
financial resources and fiscal authority in Argentina and Spain. My discussion should provide an 
understanding of what type of political interferences affect the policy of transferring revenue to 
subnational governments, and why we should expect to see spatial and temporal variation in the 
distribution of revenue to lower levels of government. The data analyzed in this study find 
preliminary support for the central role of federal institutional arrangements and their regional 
power asymmetries in shaping political strategies and policy outcomes. More specifically, the 
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 main contention of this study is that relative differences in the encapsulation of territorial and 
partisan interests at the legislative level have a causal impact on intergovernmental bargaining to 
decide the fate of fiscal decentralization reforms or lack thereof.  
 
In Argentina, the sorting out of fiscal decentralization policies is “locked-in” at the senate level, 
where peripheral provinces are overrepresented. This balance of power shields the latter from the 
political hurdles and fiscal responsibilities derived from own-revenue mobilization, it perpetuates 
fiscal centralization based on intergovernmental transfers, and, ultimately, it engenders a fiscal 
policy regime based on cooptation and patronage. In turn, this institutional insulation of 
subnational interests induces resented provincial executives to address redistributive regional 
concerns bilaterally with the national executive, on a first-come-first-serve basis. 
 
A more malleable, open-ended institutional configuration of territorial representation in Spain, 
however, does not inevitably thwart subnational assertiveness. On the contrary, the combined 
effect of regionalist-party dominance in fiscally-competent ACs, their increasing influence in the 
national parliament, and their concomitant acceptance in emerging joint policy-making 
mechanisms inhibits backward regions’ attempts to preserve the status quo (i.e. revenue 
centralization). Albeit not entirely keen yet “institutionally” unable to block the moves of richer 
regions, the latter follow suit. The resulting outcome is increasing multilateral fiscal 
collaboration and expanding decentralization 
 
Despite the overall significance of our findings, there are several issues that still deserve further 
attention. First, this dissertation is based on cross-regional research, which is an area of 
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 comparative politics that still remains relatively underdeveloped. Among the several 
methodological and conceptual issues affecting cross-regional research the “traveling problem” 
stands out as a major challenge for conducting this type of study. The choice of combining 
national and subnational levels in Argentina and Spain has eased, to some extent, this issue but 
problems remain. For instance, there is a risk that these countries may become less comparable 
over time given their respective regional contexts. While Argentina is associated with 
MERCOSUR, which acts as a relatively symbolic and poorly institutionalized regional bloc, 
Spain is influenced by the EU drives to become a “political union” (Sbragia, forthcoming).  
 
Second, this study suggests that fiscal decentralization is subject to the same log-rolls and 
exchanges that affect any policy arena. Despite prevailing approaches to decentralization that 
emphasize macro-level processes and phenomena like democratization, liberalization,  
globalization and others,  we find more merit in explanations that focus on the political interests 
of politicians, regional leaders, and the domestic institutional configuration. Amid considerable 
attention paid to decentralization in International Financial Institutions (IFI) such as the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank reports, national concerns about the distribution of 
intergovernmental fiscal authority precede these international mostly pro-decentralization voices. 
In Argentina, which is relatively more exposed to effect of foreign aid conditionality, fiscal 
decentralization looms large as an important and long-dated topic in discussions about the 
federal character of its political system. And in Spain, partly due to it higher level of regional 
embededdness as an EU member-country, IFI’s policy advice is not decisively consequential. 
This is not say that international influences do not “matter” but, rather, meant to suggest that it is 
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 necessary to rethink some theoretical and empirical considerations related to our understanding 
of said influences. 
 
Third, and relatedly, policy recommendation for fiscal reforms in decentralized polities should 
consider that the timing and sequencing of fiscal and political decentralization reforms are of 
essence. For instance, the putative fiscal benefits of decentralization to disadvantaged areas are 
rendered moot, when the amount of transfers to them is dictated by political influence beyond 
social welfare. In this regard, our study highlights the geographical uneven nature of fiscal 
reforms and how liberal, efficiency-enhancing decentralization policies can be blocked by the 
concomitant entrenchment of patronage-ridden, politically-shielded regional enclaves. The 
Argentine experience suggests that the relationship between the provinces and their budgets and 
the central government cannot be sorted out from the effect of political institutions and their 
related regional power asymmetries. If this is correct, institutional reforms in areas such as 
electoral malapportionment should be contemporaneous, or even precede, fiscal decentralization 
reforms. 
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2 Chapter 2: Institutional Sources of Fiscal Decentralization: “The Rules 
of the Game” and Subnational Politics 
 
In this chapter, we will draw on empirical institutional analysis4 and new insights from interest 
group theory to shed light on the mechanism linking the political determination of transfers and 
the inter-regional distribution. The first approach will allow us to compare systematically the 
representation of territorial interests in the Argentine and Spanish Senates, pinpointing how their 
respective levels of overrepresentation and policy authority shape coalition building in 
distributive politics. With regard to the latter approach, we draw on Ellen Immergut’s concept of 
“veto points” to explain why Argentine subnational interests are “locked-in” at the formal 
legislative level, whereas open-ended institutional arrangements in Spain, unleashed by rapid 
federalization, made possible the sorting out of regional disputes through informal joint policy-
making bodies.  
 
2.1 The Territorial Role of Political Institutions: Representation and Policy 
Scope of the Senate 
 
2.1.1 The “Puzzle” 
In their study of bicameralism, Tsebelis and Money (1997: 33) argue that “in most federal 
systems the legitimacy of upper houses remains unquestioned and their power unconstrained”. 
While there is a large kernel of truth in this claim, this section will add some nuances to their 
statement by illustrating variation in the extent to which the Argentine and Spanish Senates 
represent subnational interests and in their ability to provide a forum for the different territorial 
units to debate policies. In the process of showing the formal structural differences of said 
                                                 
4   For an insightful review of this analytical perspective, see Peters (1999: 78-96). 
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 bodies, attention is focused on the basis of their composition, how chosen, and their policy 
scope. These questions about institutional design do not only reflect the formal structure but they 
also illustrate why political decision-making follows characteristic patterns in different polities. 
As historical institutionalist approaches contend, “a nation’s electoral system and constitutional 
structure provide the institutional ‘rules of the game’ in which subsequent political battles are 
fought (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 22). Subsequent to comparing these cases, we will show that 
the Argentine Senate exercises more influence than its Spanish counterpart, but the 
powerlessness and ostensible policy irrelevance of the latter rendered a “window of opportunity” 
for the articulation of subnational interests through informal territorial institutions. This point 
will be analyzed more carefully in the subsequent section addressing the issue of institutional 
interest representation. The puzzle, then, is to explain why the comparative strengths of the 
Argentine Senate amounted to a “double-edged sword” whereby, on the one hand, provincial-
level actors have numerous opportunities to exert influence on the fate of intergovernmental 
transfers and, on the other, it locks in the existing politicization of decentralization policies and 
make the pursuit of fiscal accountability harder. And, why the weaknesses of the Spanish Senate 
amounted to an institutional facilitator that helped to create alternative fora for fiscal 
intergovernmental coordination and thus to advance the cause of fiscal federalism in Spain.   
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 2.1.1.1 Representation: Who and How? 
Unlike lower houses5, which are elected directly by a nation’s citizens, with equal weight given 
to each eligible voter, representation in the senate varies in two main dimensions: who is 
represented (i.e. constituent groups) and how they are represented (i.e. method of selection). On 
the first dimension, it is normal to compose the senate in some way that is different from the way 
in which the low house is chosen (Patterson and Mughan 1999: 10-12). With the exceptions of 
Italy and Japan, where both houses are chosen on an equal basis, some differentiation between 
popular and territorial representation exists. The Argentine and Spanish Senates represent 
geographical constituent unit, which do not exclusively draw on population levels. However, 
while provinces are the relevant political unit in Argentina, the connection between territory and 
senate representation in Spain is less clear-cut.  Based on a hybrid arrangement that somewhat 
resembles the German system, representation in the senate is primarily on the basis of sub-
regional provinces6 (electoral unit), which each have equal representation. These provincial 
representatives amount to 208 out of a total of 256 senators. The remaining seats are occupied by 
ACs representatives, with seats distributed on a population-based formula similar to that used in 
Germany and Austria (Flores Juberías 1999). Secondly, leaving aside those who are ex-officio 
members of a senate7, the basic choice is between election and appointment. The former method 
is the most frequently employed, particularly in federal systems like the United States, Australia, 
Switzerland and others. However, in some cases, indirect representation precedes the adoption of 
direct election. While direct elections for the US Senate were introduced in 1913, Argentina has 
                                                 
5   We will use the notions of lower house, lower chamber, and chamber of deputies 
interchangeably. 
6   Unlike Argentina, provinces in Spain are the political units positioned between the second-tier 
ACs and municipal government. For more details, see Appendix 1. 
7   Apart from lifetime appointments in the British House of Lords, the Italian Senate includes a 
nominal number of Prime Ministerial appointees (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 47). 
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 only adopted direct election of senators after the Constitutional Reform in 1994. In Spain, like 
the pre-1994 period in Argentina, senators representing ACs are designated by the Autonomous 
Parliaments, thus indirectly elected. 
 
The above-mentioned differences between the Argentine and Spanish Senates notwithstanding, 
Lijphart (1999: 207; 211) claims that both countries have an incongruent bicameral structure 
because their respective houses are formally elected by different methods and represent different 
constituent units. Note that the degree of incongruence is positively associated with senate 
strength because the latter’s capacity of contestation is bolstered when its composition does not 
mimic the composition of the other house. Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to talk about 
levels of congruence rather about its presence or absence. Lijphart’s approach to congruence as a 
categorical trait masks important differences among cases. While it is something of a 
conventional wisdom in the literature about Argentine political institutions that a fully 
incongruent senate is causally related to this country’s strong bicameral structure (Molinelli, 
Palanza and Sin 1999: 55-58), the same cannot be said of Spain, where almost 82 percent of the 
senators are elected on the same territorial basis as the members of the national parliament. What 
is more, and suggesting that the characterization of Spanish bicameralism as incongruent is 
questionable, while senatorial elections in Argentina are staggered, the vast majority of Spanish 
Senators are elected the same day as the Diputados in the lower house. As a result, the partisan 
composition of the Senate is unrepresentative of that of AC governments, as its electoral system 
encourages voters to cast a ballot for the same party of government in Madrid.8 In brief, 
                                                 
8   In this regard, there is an ongoing tension between the miniscule role played by regionalist 
parties in Senate and their leading role in regional governments (Gunther, Montero and Botella 
2004: 121).  
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 Argentine senators are better equipped to represent subnational interests than their Spanish 
counterparts. 
 
2.1.1.1.1 POLICY SCOPE 
Before we proceed to examine the level of policy authority of the senate in both countries, what 
difference does bicameralism make with respect to fiscal policy performance? Or, put 
differently, does the fact that revenue-sharing bills are dealt with, or alternatively blocked, at the 
senate level make any difference in terms of policy outputs? Extant research suggests that 
bicameralism induces greater fiscal deficits and, more indirectly, precludes economic 
adjustment. According to Heller (1997), who surveyed 17 unicameral and bicameral democracies 
from 1965 to 1990, “government budget deficits are higher when policy conflict is built into the 
budget process, specifically in the form of a bilateral veto game between legislative chambers”. 
In a similar fashion, Remmer and Wibbels (2000) observe that subnational interests in Argentina 
are in a pivotal position to offer resistance to national policies of economic adjustment because 
provinces can make adroit use of territorial representational advantages. However, there is an 
alternative body of scholarship that explores the possibility of a positive effect of bicameralism 
on public finances. While this literature is somewhat eclectic in its analytical focus, its common 
thread is that senatorial intervention in the policy-making process is advantageous insofar as it 
offers an additional arena of deliberation and fine-tuning of public policies. For instance, Vatter 
(in Nolte 2002: 18) shows that bicameralism strengthens fiscal decentralization and precludes 
“over-fishing” at the subnational level. Likewise, Lane and Ersson (in Nolte 2002: 18) claim that 
“when there is a symmetrically composed two-chamber assembly, then public expenditures tend 
to be lower and surpluses higher”. So, while the jury is still out to determine the effect of 
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 bicameralism on fiscal outputs, it becomes apparent that senates “matter” in the politics of fiscal 
federalism. 
 
2.1.1.1.2 THE SENATE AS “VETO PLAYER” 
In formulating one of the most seminal analytical frameworks of rational choice theory, Tsebelis 
(1995: 293) defines veto players as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is 
required for a policy decision”.  Veto players can be grouped into two major different categories: 
“partisan” veto players, namely the political parties in the legislature and “institutional” veto 
players, which include the executive, both legislative houses, and to some extent, the courts, 
constitutionally required super majorities and referendums. In a nutshell, veto player perspective 
assesses a problem of collective action, one in which selective incentives must be dispensed in 
order to guarantee political support for effective governance. More specifically, this approach 
seeks to pinpoint the conditions for co-opting supporters in the policy process.   
 
So, to what extent are the Argentine and Spanish Senates “veto players”? To respond this 
question, we will focus on their respective (exclusive) policy competences and how 
disagreements between both houses are resolved in each country. Argentina in theory follows the 
US constitutional formula of bicameral “symmetry of policy scope” (Stepan 2001: 345). While 
symmetry denotes that both houses are equally important and that the consent of both houses is 
necessary for most important decisions9, there are some policy areas in which they have greater 
prerogatives. The lower house has greater authority in originating money bills, general tax laws, 
                                                 
9   However, when disagreement between houses persists, the Argentine Congress resorts to the 
navette system to resolve it. If after several rounds of intercameral exchanges of bill proposals 
discrepancies cannot be bridged, the originating house has the upper hand and makes the final 
decision (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 54-55). 
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 troop recruitment and others. The senate, on the other hand, is in charge of approving 
presidential nominees and advisors, authorize the president to declare a coup d’etat in case of 
foreign military attack and appoint judges that assess federal expenditures. More crucially from 
the perspective our study, all revenue-sharing bills (including federal transfers) must originate in 
the senate. Additional senatorial prerogatives can be cited at length, but the encapsulation of 
fiscal decentralization issues at the Senate level suffice to highlight why this house is the 
institutional point of reference to uncover the politicization of these issues. This perception of the 
policy-making scope of the Senate is confirmed by a recent cross-national survey of 
bicameralism in nine Latin American countries, concluding that Argentina ranks as the most 
symmetrical bicameral system in the region and thus “the senate is constitutionally equipped to 
act as an actual ‘veto player’ insofar as it can delay lower house legislation at ease and 
eventually generate legislative paralysis” (Llanos 2002: 21). 
 
We are not the first to point out that the Spanish Senate lacks significant policy-making 
powers.10 The Spanish constitution allows autonomic parliaments to propose bills to the national 
assembly. These bills may be introduced by representatives of the former bodies but, 
paradoxically, the alleged chamber of territorial representation is bypassed and plays no major 
role. Beyond scrutiny functions such convening special investigative commissions or forcing 
ministers to answer questions and pale legislative roles like the responding to bills already 
discussed and passed the parliament, “the senate has absolutely no voice in the selection and 
permanence in office of the executive” (Flores Juberías 1999: 287). More crucially, its footing in 
the territorial policy domain is quite limited as well. While the authorization of cooperation 
                                                 
10  See, for instance, Aja (1999), Beramendi and Máiz (2004), Börzel (2002), Gunther, Montero 
and Botella (2004), Solozábal (1996). 
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 agreements between the ACs appears to be an issue that falls within the senate’s jurisdiction, its 
authority is limited to postponing the moment that the lower house is allowed to impose its will 
on the senate in this issue. In an attempt to revamp the role of the senate as a more territorial 
chamber, the Comisión General de las Comunidades Autónomas, General Committee for the 
Autonomous Communities, was established in 1994. Despite some positive moves such as 
opening its doors to representatives of AC governments and debating territorial issues, Eliseo 
Aja, a leading scholar of Spanish federalism, argues that this committee experiences the same 
structural limitations the senate does, amounting to a “small senate inside the senate” (Aja 1999: 
146).  
 
How does the Spanish Senate compare with its Argentine counterpart in terms of its “veto 
player” status? While based on the afore-mentioned policy-making powers it does not appear 
that the Spanish Senate is a “veto player” in its own right until far-reaching institutional reforms 
take place11, Stepan (2004: 328-329) claims that the senate can potentially become a “veto 
player” on the basis of the Article 155 of Spanish Constitution. This article establishes that the 
senate can adopt measures to force regional governments to fulfill their legal/constitutional 
obligations and prevent them from acting against the “general interest” of Spain. However, and 
citing Juan Linz’s authoritative opinion on Spanish politics, Stepan acknowledges that said 
article has never been applied because it could only become effective through a federal 
deposition of the government and military occupation of a recalcitrant AC, leading to an eventual 
subnational regime breakdown. Hence, we are more inclined to downplay the actual “veto 
player” potential of the Senate of Spain. 
                                                 
11   On the difficulties to reform the Spanish Senate, see Roller (2002). 
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 2.1.1.1.2.1 “When Effects Become Causes”: Malapportionment12 and Its 
Consequences 
 
In federal systems, where territorial representation is juxtaposed to population representation, 
unequal representation of subnational units is commonplace (Lijphart 1984). Partly as a “built-
in” feature of federalism aimed at redressing economic and demographic vulnerability of smaller 
jurisdictions, these are deliberately (i.e. constitutionally) overrepresented in the Senate.13 
Consequently, this should hold as well for the Argentine and Spanish upper chambers. 
Subsequent to illustrating the extent of malapportionment in these cases, we will elaborate 
analytically why institutional overrepresentation is inextricably linked with distributive policy 
outputs. While malapportionment in the Spanish Senate is not entirely inconsequential, we will 
argue that, given its egregious nature and based on the significant policy-making powers of the 
senate, legislative overrepresentation in Argentina stands out as a decisive independent variable 
to explain the paucity of fiscal decentralization reforms. 
 
How pervasive is Senate malpportionment in Argentina and Spain? According to the 
Stepan/Swenden Federal Databank, which uses the Gini Index of Inequality to measure 
malapportionment14, Argentina has the world’s highest level of senate overrepresentation.  
                                                 
12   While the former concept is more commonly used at the micro level (i.e. the votes of some 
citizens weigh more than the votes of other citizens), overrepresentation is employed to denote 
institutional apportionment. Some scholars prefer the latter term, because the term 
malapportionment carries a more distinctive negative connotation (Gibson, Calvo and Falletti 
1998: 2). We, however, will use both terms interchangeably. 
13   Despite that senates are overly more overrepresented, lower chambers are sometimes subject 
to malapportionment. Both unitary Colombia and New Zealand, which reserve seats for 
indigenous people on a non-geographic basis, and federal India, where designated casts districts 
are overrepresented, share a high level of lower house malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder 
2001: 658).  
14   For a detailed explanation of the calculation of this index, see Stepan (2001: 344). 
27 
  
Table 1:  SENATE OVERREPRESENTATION (Stepan/Swenden data) 
Gini Index of Inequality    Percentage of Seats of Best 
       Represented Decile 
Belgium  .015    Belgium  10.8 
Austria  .05    Austria  11.9 
India   .10    India   15.4 
Spain   .31    Spain   23.7 
Germany  .32    Germany  24.0 
Canada  .34    Australia  28.7 
Australia  .36    Canada  33.4 
Russia   .43    Russia   35.0 
Switzerland  .45    Switzerland  38.4 
USA   .49    USA   39.7 
Brazil   .52    Brazil   41.3 
Argentina  .61    Argentina  44.8 
MEAN  .33    MEAN  28.3   
Source: Stepan (1997) and own calculations. Higher values denote higher malapportionment. 
 
Table 1, which uses the afore-mentioned databank, also shows how Argentina and Spain fare 
compared to other ten federal systems. It indicates that Argentina’s figures for the Gini Index and 
percentage of seats for best represented decile nearly double those of Spain. While Spain has 
relatively high level of senate overrepresentation compared to similar multinational federations 
like Belgium and India, its figures are much lower than those for ethnically-diverse Canada and 
Switzerland. Note that Spain ranks below the mean in both measures.  To corroborate whether 
these results are a function of the dataset used for Table 1, we will triangulate them with data 
from Samuels and Snyder’s study of comparative malapportionment.15 Table 2 shows the 
world’s twenty most overrepresented senates and, confirming the previous analysis, Argentina 
ranks first. Spain, on the other hand, appears to show a somewhat higher level of 
                                                 
15   This study uses the Loosemore-Hanby Index of Electoral Disproportionality (D), which takes 
the absolute value of the difference between each district’s seat and population shares. For a 
more complete explanation, see Samuels and Snyder (2001: 654-655).  
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 malapportionment because it is slightly above the mean value yet short of modifying the pattern 
of Table 1, as it only outdoes Germany but by a small margin. 
 
 
Table 2: SENATE OVERREPRESENTATION (SAMUELS/SNYDER DATA) 
  MALUC Federal   MALUC Federal 
        
Czech Rep. 0.0257    Chile  0.3106     
Italy  0.0292    Venezuela 0.3265  Yes 
Austria 0.0301  Yes  Russia  0.3346  Yes 
Romania 0.0592    Switzerland 0.3448  Yes 
India  0.0747  Yes  USA  0.3642  Yes 
Japan  0.1224    Bolivia 0.3805   
Poland  0.2029    Brazil  0.4039  Yes 
S. Africa 0.2261  Yes  Argentina 0.4852  Yes 
Mexico 0.2300  Yes 
Germany 0.2440  Yes 
Spain  0.2853  Yes 
Australia 0.2962  Yes 
MEAN 0.2388       
Source: Samuels and Snyder (2001) and own calculations. Higher values denote higher 
malapportionment. 
 
Does senate overrepresentation matter? In essence, cross-national evidence suggests that senate’s 
unequal representation of subnational units shapes legislators’ strategies for pursuing distributive 
policy agendas. However obvious this argument may appear, a large part of the scholarly work 
on US legislative politics has downplayed the effect of senate apportionment on coalition 
building. For instance, Riker’s seminal notion of minimum-winning coalitions tells us more about 
the rules of the game than about asymmetries in the composition of winning coalitions. Drawing 
on this thesis, formal theory scholars have not paid sufficient heed to the pervasive small-state 
advantages in the distribution of federal funds (Atlas et al. 1995). Lee and Oppenheimer (in Lee 
2000: 59) provide a convincing explanation for this legislative outcome: “Apportionment shapes 
Senate distributive policy-making for two reasons. First, senators representing small states have 
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 more to gain from procuring a given amount of federal dollars than do senators who represent 
larger states. A federal grant of $5 million, for example, has a far greater effect in Wyoming than 
in California. Such a grant yields greater electoral benefits for senators who represent small 
states, both in terms of their statewide visibility and the percentage of residents 
benefited….Second, Senate apportionment affects the incentives of coalition builders in 
distributive policymaking. The tremendous differences in state population create a unique 
coalition-building dynamics: All senators’ votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, but 
they are not equal in price”. This interpretation is echoed in recent work on Brazilian politics, 
indicating that malapportionment and clientelism are “two sides of the same coin” (Ames 2001). 
Further, Mainwaring (1999: 270-271) claims that overrepresentation of poor states helps explain 
not only pork-barrel politics but also “the disjuncture between Brazil’s economic development 
and the underdevelopment of its political institutions”.  
 
As the statistics presented above succinctly suggest, senate malapportionment manifests itself in 
Argentina more than elsewhere. And its effects are highly axiomatic: virtually no policy coalition 
can be put together without the support of the regional structures of power of sparsely-populated 
and economically-underdeveloped provinces. Alike Brazil, “strengthening the financial position” 
of small provinces affords incumbent national administrations significant political payoffs. 
Unlike Brazil, and taking aim with Mainwaring’s contention, we argue that this “devil’s pact” 
does not lead to institutional decay. On the contrary, it boosts predictability in the 
intergovernmental rules of the game and, thus, makes “increasing returns processes” more 
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 sustainable.16 Such inducements, however, create an equilibrium that poses acute problems to 
feedback processes and consequently foreclose policy reforms to temper the patronage-financed 
debt spending of Argentine provinces, particularly the small ones. 
 
The combined effect of the scant policymaking powers of the Spanish Senate and its 
comparatively lower malapportionment levels, which render a more limited “opportunity 
structure” for small ACs to cajole federal transfers, helps to explain why, in contrast, subnational 
actors in Spain had to generate alternative means of action and representation.17 As we will 
illustrate in the next section, the deficiencies of the Senate engendered a decisional vacuum to be 
filled by the creation of intergovernmental coordinating agencies like the CPPF and, to a lesser 
extent, the Conferencias Sectoriales, Sectoral Conferences, which are multilateral forums where 
ACs exchange information with the national administration and among them. The weak 
institutionalization of the senate and its lack of compensatory representational devices to redress 
inter-regional gaps have been counterbalanced by a gradual process of “experiential learning” 
(Olsen and Peters 1996). This open-endedness has imbued intergovernmental relations in Spain 
with a market-like character, where the fiscal accomplishments and steadfast regionalist 
leadership of ACs like Catalonia, Baleares, Navarra, and the Basque Country hindered even 
further any attempt of economically-peripheral ACs to offset their fiscal misfortunes through 
                                                 
16   In a landmark essay, Pierson (2000) couched the notion of “political increasing returns” to 
underscore the strong status quo bias generally built into political institutions.  
17   This institutionalist view of the Spanish Senate is matched by ordinary citizens’ perception of 
the role of this body in the politics of their country. In his study of public opinion in Spain, 
Lancaster (1997) shows that the senate is the least popular institution.  
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 federal largesse. Above and beyond the fiscal revamping of the weak, formal institutional 
vulnerability opened the door for policy innovation.18
 
2.1.1.1.2.1.1.1 The Relational Role of Political Institutions: “The Rules of the 
Game” and Intergovernmental Instruments of Cooperation 
 
Painting in broad strokes, we can say that Ellen Immergut provides a very satisfying explanation 
of institutional malleability, which will be analytically applied to uncover differences between 
the Argentina’s predominantly stagnant regionalism and Spain’s drift to multilateral subnational 
collaboration. This contrast is the last building bloc in our explanation of the entrenchment of 
patronage-dependent provincial forces and fiscal decentralization stagnation in Argentina and 
Spain’s incremental progression to fiscal federalism.  
 
In any political system, the adoption of a new policy deviating from the status quo (e.g. fiscal 
centralization) requires the agreement of certain political actors. Leaving aside whether a larger 
number of such political actors is normatively desirable19, policy change becomes more difficult 
when these actors proliferate. The necessity to decrease the number of such crucial actors is an 
issue that both “old” and “new” institutionalisms draw our attention to. From a state-society 
centered perspective, the notion of corporatism gives preferential treatment20 to state-sponsored 
societal organized interests, whereas neo-institutionalists (e.g. George Tsebelis) focus more 
compellingly on the institutional “black box” itself. Implicitly maintaining that these approaches 
                                                 
18   For an analysis of policy innovation in Argentina, see Keech (1999). 
19   While the modern literature in political science, with Lijphart (1999) as an exception, 
emphasizes the need of effective governance, there is no shortage of arguments on behalf of 
increasing the number of “veto players”, ranging from Baron de Montesquieu’s theory of 
separation of powers to John Stuart Mill’s praise of representative government. 
20   Or, according to Schmitter (1974), exclusive. 
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 are overly static or mechanistic, Immergut (1992) introduces the notion of “veto points”, which 
are basically areas of institutional vulnerability, namely, junctures in the policy process where 
opponents can frustrate policy change. Instead of seeing institutional representation as a  rigid 
end point, the notion of “veto points” suggests that “electoral rules and constitutional structures 
provide the institutional ‘rules of the game’ in which subsequent political battles are fought” 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 22). Moreover, this understanding of the policy-making process is 
also consonant with our previous analysis insofar as the relative differences in policy-making 
powers of their respective senates and the presence or absence of institutional facilitators for 
disadvantaged subnational units in Argentina and Spain shape political interactions. Last, this 
approach is valuable to analyze countries that undergo institutional transformation like Spain and 
its ongoing process of federalization. Likewise, Argentina has recently experience profound 
institutional reforms such as the constitutional reform of 1994.21  
 
2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2 The “Puzzle” 
In this section, we explore the explanatory value of the “veto points” perspective to understand 
why the mere existence of strong representative institutions of territorial interests does not 
necessarily mean that they are effective in advancing the horizontal division of powers between 
the central and regional governments. As shown above, a mighty senate may fall short of 
becoming an actual arena of intergovernmental exchanges, when subnational units are 
disproportionately overrepresented. Or put in “veto points” terms, when a highly institutionalized 
                                                 
21   This constitutional reform includes: the abolition of the Electoral College and adoption of 
direct presidential elections, the possibility of re-election for incumbent presidents, political 
decentralization of the capital city (Buenos Aires) and, more relevant to our subject of study, the 
introduction of socio-demographic and economic variables, in lieu of fixed coefficients, in the 
determination of revenue-sharing. Interestingly, from said list of reforms, the latter is the only 
one that still did not materialize. 
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 political structure of territorial representation such as the Argentine Senate is adjacent to 
exceedingly malapportioned electoral rules, it will perpetuate existing pathologies in distributive 
policy. At this juncture, some provinces (i.e. peripheral, transfer-dependent) are motivated to 
preserve the status quo and other provinces (i.e. metropolitan, more fiscally-proficient) prefer to 
move away from it. Because the former group of provinces affords the national government a 
legislative majority at a “convenient” price, distributive policy (i.e. fiscal decentralization) bears 
out cooptative and patronage-ridden undertones. Of necessity, the latter group of provinces seeks 
to level out their share and press their case with national authorities. The resulting outcome is 
bilateral fiscal agreements and incomplete decentralization. By the same token, feeble territorial 
representation at the senate level does not inevitably thwart subnational assertiveness. In Spain, 
regionalist-party dominance in fiscally-competent ACs, their increasing influence in the national 
parliament, and their concomitant acceptance in emerging joint policy-making mechanisms 
inhibited backward regions’ attempts to preserve the status quo (i.e. revenue centralization). 
Albeit not entirely keen yet “institutionally” unable to block the moves of richer regions, the 
latter follow suit. The resulting outcome is increasing multilateral fiscal collaboration and 
expanding decentralization. These arguments will be illustrated through the narrative of two 
contrasting experiences: The Argentine Fiscal Federal Pacts and the Spanish Council for Fiscal 
and Financing Policy of the ACs. 
 
2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.1 Bilateral and “Uninstitutionalized” Bargaining: The 1992 and 1993 
Pactos Fiscales in Argentina 
 
Imagine the following picture: Nearly 100 provincial representatives (governors, vice governors, 
provincial economy ministers and economic advisors) gather in a dreary building in Buenos 
Aires city. The raison d'être of this gathering is to persuade said representatives to forsake 15 
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 percent of their respective provinces’ coparticipated tax revenues to overhaul the then moribund 
national social security system. Not far from this building, caravans of annoyed pensioners 
march forcefully into the Congress amid threats of continuing their hunger strikes. Expectedly, 
and despite these representatives ostensible empathy with the cause of street demonstrators, no 
agreement can be hammered out.22  
 
This chaotic background compounded the signature of the 1992 Fiscal Pact at the headquarters of 
the Consejo Federal de Inversiones, CFI, Federal Investment Council.23 How can said provincial 
actors be persuaded to cut a deal that would make them less popular in their respective 
jurisdictions? First, the national government guaranteed provincial transfers of a minimum of 
US$ 725 per month. In order to make this arrangement even more “attractive”, Menem 
“sweetened” this unsettling gridlock through the creation of a special fund to finance fiscal 
disequilibria in the provinces, made up of revenues that would also be deducted from the 
automatic FTSA allocations. According to Eaton (1998: 110), “the amount that each province 
would receive from this fund was determined in one-to-one negotiations with the President. For 
example, the fact that the Radical governor of Chubut province offered early public support for 
the pact reflected Chubut’s position as one of the three provinces receiving the largest cut from 
the disequilibria fund…..Provincial governors who initially criticized the pact but eventually 
signed it (such as Mario Moine of Entre Ríos) received a smaller cut, and provincial governors 
who refused to sign (such as Rolando Tauguinas of Chaco) received none of the special funds”. 
Furthermore, the inter-provincial apportionment of this fiscal disequilibria fund does not deviate 
                                                 
22   For a more complete account of these events, see Falletti (2000: 12). 
23   Originally conceived as an inter-provincial consultative forum in regional development 
matters, the CFI has turned into a de facto branch of the Peronist Party, which typically controls 
a vast majority of governorships. 
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 from the pattern described in Chapter 3: Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego and Chubut (nearly 1.8 
percent of total national population) received US$ 3 million each, whereas Córdoba and Santa Fé 
(nearly 18 percent of total population) only US$ 0.5 million each (Falletti 2000: 12). 
 
Encouraged by the apparent success of this deal, Menem arranged a second Fiscal Pact in August 
1993. Unlike the previous pact, however, tax reform was the focus of this deal, enhancing its 
potential fiscally-decentralizing impact. Nevertheless, the provinces did not rush to join this 
second pact because of its initial stipulation to abolish the provincial turnover tax (Schwartz and 
Liuskilla 1997: 408). Expectedly, some maneuvers were necessary to cajole reluctant governors. 
First, the minimum amount set on 1992 was increased to US$ 745 million a month. Additionally, 
political guarantees to negotiate the offsetting of claims and debts between the provinces and the 
central governments were put forward. These benefit packages, however, were only applicable to 
provinces that agreed to implement the terms of the pact. To avoid further “penalties”, Chaco’s 
governor this time chose to sign the pact, for which his province had its outstanding debts bailed 
out (Eaton 1998: 111).24
 
In brief, we can argue that Argentine bilateralism is a manifestation of cost-shifting tactics for 
the provinces and divide-and-conquer for the center. The institutional “veto points” in the 
decision-making process interact with regional economic differentiation, leading to a fiscal 
policy output that amounts to an “iron law” of the political economy of intergovernmental 
                                                 
24   To illustrate how this exchange of political favors interweaves with institutional prerogatives, 
Governor Tauguinas, who rules a relatively under-populated province, subsequently supported 
Menem’s campaign for the Constitutional Reform of 1994. It is noteworthy that the assembly 
charged with rewriting the constitution was even more skewed than is representation in the 
senate. Buenos Aires province had one representative for every 109,000 citizens and Tierra del 
Fuego had one for every 6,000 (Sawers1996: 96). 
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 relations in Argentina: revenue centralization as a shielding mechanism for economically weak 
yet politically powerful provinces. 
 
2.1.1.1.2.1.1.2.2 Emerging Multilateral Bargaining: The Spanish Consejo de 
Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas 
 
Created in 1980, the CPFF is composed of the national Minister of Economy and Finance and his 
counterpart in each region, and the Minister of Public Administration. It acts as a consultative 
and discussion body, which concerns itself with the coordination of policy with particular regard 
to the distribution of national resources to the regions, public investment, the costs of services 
and public debt. This is the intergovernmental coordination body of highest importance (Huerta 
Carbonell 1992: 215). The agreements reached within the CPFF, then, form the basis for 
developing the ACs financing arrangements.  
The above having been said, there has been a tendency in the specialized literature to 
characterize the CPFF as merely symbolic, as a forum guided by a “hierarchical perception of 
intergovernmental relations, since the minister (i.e. the national Minister of Economy and 
Finance) calls the conference, chairs it and sets the agenda. This fosters the atmosphere of 
‘institutional courtesy’ in the forum, as the ACs have only a very passive role in the discussions” 
(Grau i Creus 2000: 63). Other scholars have ironically suggested that these meetings amount to 
“cooperación por teléfono”, cooperation by phone (Albertí Rovira 1991: 214). Further, Aja 
(1999: 227) claims that the CPPF is a mirror image of party politics: When this forum 
recommended in 1993 the transfer of the 15 percent of the general income taxes to all ACs, 
Galicia, which is a PP bastion, voted against it and even appealed to the Constitutional Court.  
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 However, it voted in favor of a transfer of the 30 percent of the same tax in 1996 carried out by 
Aznar’s administration. 
 
It is precisely party politics what rendered opportunities to expand the role of CPPF and its 
modus operandum. While admitting that the afore-mentioned tactical behavior of Galicia is very 
telling, it is noticeable that despite PSOE’s participation in the ruling coalitions in Navarra, 
Aragon, and Asturias did not impede these ACs to support the PP- sponsored 30 percentage 
reform. Moreover, regionalist party officials, by and large from Catalonia and the Basque 
Country, advocated deepening revenue decentralization on efficiency as well as on nationalist 
grounds. For that purpose, they encouraged the formation of mixed technical commission of 
autonomic and national officials known as Comisiones Mixtas, Mixed Commisions, whose 
multilateral character was somewhat daunting for more transfer-dependent ACs (Ramallo 
Massanet and Zornoza Pérez 2000). Nonetheless, regionalist party representatives from poorer 
ACs had a very hard time in articulating regional assertiveness amid hostility to fiscal 
decentralization moves, so that they gradually moved closer to their more nationalistically-
minded counterparts. Exogenous factors such as Europeanization played a role, insofar as 
regions were endowed with significant resources, including know-how applicable to the 
sometimes highly technical content of discussions held in the Mixed Commissions.25
                                                 
25   We disagree, however, with monocausal explanations based on EU influences such as Tanja 
Börzel’s approach. She claims that “while the extension of multilateral intergovernmental 
cooperation may reflect a certain consolidation of  Spanish intergovernmental relations, the 
functioning of the 16 Euro-effective conferences confirms that the major proposition of this 
study that multilateral cooperation is the response to Europeanization rather than the result of the 
consolidation of the State of the Autonomies” (Börzel 2002: 146-47). In addition to 
supranational-level influences, scholarly discussions about the future of decentralization in Spain 
were deeply influenced by the German experience and concepts such Bundestreue (federal 
loyalty) are oftentimes made reference to (Aja 1999: 142-43). 
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In conclusion, in contrast with the cost-sharing strategy of Argentine provinces, Spanish ACs 
opted to increase collaborative patterns in policy-making, in which representatives of the 
different levels negotiate their major differences at the program design and implementation 
stages. Unlike Argentina, the increasing pivotal role played by regionalist parties in national 
formal and informal fora played a more critical role than the encapsulation of unequal territorial 
representation at the legislative level. Albeit not entirely stress-free, as some peripheral ACs 
resisted the pace and nature of reforms, fiscal decentralization in Spain expanded to levels 
comparable to those of Germany and closer to Switzerland 
 
Summary 
The findings of this chapter have implications both for the political science literature on 
comparative federalism and for the literature on fiscal decentralization in these and other 
countries. Given research trends in the former literature, some of our findings are surprising. The 
concept of institutional vulnerability, a byproduct of “veto points” theory, appears to be more 
useful in explaining the stochastic nature of fiscal decentralization policies than notions of 
institutional embeddedness. More than the formal rules per se, the interaction between 
institutional structures (e.g. the senate) and political hurdles gives rise to the “rules of the game”. 
Put simply, overrepresented territories yield political payoffs that afford them “immunity” to 
revenue decentralization imperatives. In this vein, the “veto points” framework involves different 
opportunities for influencing political decisions. In assessing how the politics of fiscal 
decentralization varies in Argentina and Spain, we are able to conclude that institutional 
“overdevelopment” and the ensuing “locking-in” of a lopsided connection between territorial 
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 overrepresentation and the non-proportional distribution of public funds in the former country 
propitiates the maintenance of a fiscally-ineffective but politically-desired status quo. And we 
are also able to conclude that institutional malleability and open-endedness rendered 
opportunities to regionally-assertive entrepreneurs for claiming further competences, including 
revenue collection and administration.  
 
This understanding of fiscal decentralization also speaks to a body of scholarship on fiscal 
federalism that focuses on incentives and goals (e.g. rent-seeking, fiscal performance) without 
explicitly and systematically identifying the political framework in which fiscal decentralization 
decisions are taken.26 To address this apparent theoretical gap, our study first identifies two 
contrasting approaches, one economic and the other political, to explain intergovernmental 
transfers, test them in Argentina and Spain, and thereafter we move inductively to contextualize 
the findings of the statistical analysis using qualitative evidence from these countries. To 
conclude, and borrowing from a recent and enlightening study of federalism by Filippov, 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (2004: 138), “fiscal allocations are biased toward certain states or 
groups of states almost everywhere, because the ability to cater to particular local needs is an 
essential characteristic and advantage of the federal form”. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26   For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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3 Chapter 3: The Political Significance of Fiscal Decentralization 
In both developed and developing countries, there has been a contemporary debate on the nature 
and merits of decentralization. The collapse of communism and the “crisis” of the welfare state 
have rekindled serious thinking about the relationship between governance and the appropriate 
level of devolution of power away from the central state to lower levels of administrative and 
political authority. Moreover, the growing demand for public services and infrastructure in Third 
World countries has brought increasing calls for decentralization to develop taylor-made policies 
in congruence with varying national needs (Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson 1989). 
However, and despite the fact that decentralization issues have been on the political front-burner 
in the last two decades, no single paradigm or theoretical model informs the study and practice of 
decentralization policies across nations.  
 
On a very general level, decentralization is the transfer of responsibilities and revenue from 
national government to subnational offices (Rondinelli 1981). This definition suggests that 
power is being given away through a series of measures and steps meant to eliminate overload at 
the central level, in which case decentralization denotes a process rather than a final or pre-set 
goal. Despite most studies of decentralization accept a process-oriented perspective, there is no 
overarching agreement about its goals. This is basically due to the fact that students of 
decentralization oftentimes confound political and fiscal decentralization. In Europe, there has 
been a trend to encapsulate types of decentralization under the notion of regionalism and 
regionalization. Albeit useful to pin down the determinants of regional policy in a era of global 
political and economic change (i.e, Keating and Loughlin 1997; Le Gales and Lequesne 1998), 
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 this body of research uses indicators of political and fiscal decentralization interchangeably, 
diminishing their empirical usefulness. Also, frequent regime changes and a strong “centralist 
tradition” (Veliz 1980) have been long-standing factors inflating the political nature of 
decentralization in Latin America and downplaying the significance of fiscal power relations. 
Borrowing from Bird (1993: 208), widely recognized as a leading student of fiscal 
decentralization, “decentralization seems often to mean whatever the person using the term 
wants it to mean”.  
 
To remedy this deficiency, we argue that it is important to distinguish between the distribution of 
political authority, namely the transfer of political power to subnational levels of government, 
and the organization of fiscal prerogatives, referring to where taxes are raised and public funds 
spent. The political significance of decentralization becomes apparent as it represents a necessary 
condition to advance democratization processes in countries with strong legacies of centralist and 
exclusionary politics. Strengthening local government through civil society participation and 
municipal elections constituted the dominant theme in the budding cottage industry of academic 
work on decentralization of the then transitioning democracies (Borja 1987; Gustafson 1990; 
Nickson 1995; on more developed countries, see Putnam 1993). Albeit valuable in emphasizing 
the participatory aspects of democracy, these literatures have seldom considered the determinants 
of such policies, virtually ignoring the role of institutions in uncovering the political logic of 
decisions by national authorities to decentralize.  
 
Partly due to normative assumptions and some optimism stemming from ongoing episodes of 
democratization, the “people can do it all” approach assumed that fiscal resources for effective 
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 local governance will flow once local actors will become politically invigorated. Central to all 
these arguments is the view of decentralization as promoting accountability and political 
efficacy27, bolstering popular participation and local democracy. From a totally different 
theoretical perspective, this emphasis on the efficiency gains associated with the decentralization 
of local decisions to local governments is shared by normative economic theories of federalism. 
Guided by public choice theory, this body of scholarship put forth by Charles Tiebout, Wallace 
Oates, and more recently, Barry Weingast, sees decentralization as limiting the ability of 
government officials to supply local goods on political grounds. This superiority of 
decentralization, the argument goes, is due to the fact that the principal, i.e. central government, 
delegates administration and production rights to agents with superior local information. That is 
to say, more decentralization economizes on communication costs while also leading to a control 
loss on the part of the principal. Additionally, ordinary citizens can foreshadow their 
dissatisfaction with local policies by moving to an area where their preferences are fulfilled 
(“voting with their feet”), enhancing inter-jurisdictional competition. At this juncture, literatures 
on popular democracy, on the one hand, and international financial institutions, on the other, 
paradoxically converge.   
 
While both logics linking decentralization to the “small is beautiful” and “voting with the feet” 
slogans are compelling, they fail to account for the fact that political leaders are , at the very 
least, as concerned about their power position as they are about public welfare. Despite the fact 
that both goals are not intrinsically contradictory, we will assume in this study that the former 
consideration would prevail over the latter. Politicians seek to place power where they can be 
                                                 
27 Political efficacy defined as the extent to which individual citizens feel they can affect political 
decisions (Almond and Verba 1963). 
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 more confident of controlling it, be it at the center or state level. Moreover, decentralized 
jurisdictions are less likely to attract high-caliber bureaucrats, since the rewards to local officials 
will be small in comparison to those at the central level (Tanzi 1996). Accordingly, local 
bureaucrats oftentimes compensate for this income gap through rent-seeking practices and 
corruption. The latter practices are further exacerbated by the fact that subnational 
administrations are less susceptible to public and media scrutiny than the more powerful national 
office. And from the “demand side”, people living in the periphery of democratizing countries 
are often assimilated massively into the state payroll, intensifying long-standing loyalties with 
local politicians and diminishing the probability they will sort themselves into other jurisdictions. 
Therefore, the persistance of clientelism and patronage practices implies that poor citizens have 
strong incentives to stay in rather than opting for the “exit” option. 
   
This suggests that neither the civil society approach to decentralization nor normative public 
choice theories seem to capture the multifaceted nature of decentralization. In emphasizing the 
role of both vibrant societal actors and benevolent and foresighted actions of national authorities, 
these assumptions fall short of formulating the more mundane motives behind decentralizing 
changes. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) have forcefully shown that national politicians have 
every reason to restrain inter-jurisdictional competition if that furthers their own careers. 
Furthermore, some literatures on political economy establish that central governments are 
revenue maximizers that may wish to retain taxes for their own ends (Levi 1988; Weingast 
1995). Thus, as decision to decentralize fiscal power entails significant risks, considerations 
beyond notions of public interest do shape the mindsets of national politicians. This “Leviathan” 
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 assumption about central government behavior suggests that national politicians support 
decentralization for the same reasons they support any other policy change.  
 
3.1 Why is Fiscal Decentralization Politically Important? 
In fact, fiscal arrangements are one of the most politically contested aspects in multitiered 
systems. In Germany, which is the only federation where fiscal gaps among regions are 
ameliorated by transfers from richer Länder as well as federal government (Gunlicks 2003), 
“cooperative federalism” has kindled resentment among richer Länder against “confiscatory” 
levels of transfers. This unleashed a significant number of appeals to the federal Constitutional 
Court and self-serving lawsuits by said Länder, especially after reunification (Adelberger 2001). 
There is additional evidence from cases in which small states play a king-making role. While 
asymmetries in population, size, and economic power are commonplace in decentralized 
systems, overrepresentation of states in national governing bodies is a major determinant of 
fiscal responsibilities and outcomes. Gibson and Calvo (2000) have shown that legislative 
overrepresentation in Argentina and Brazil produces federal spending distortions in favor of 
overrepresented territories. Patterns of federal spending  reflect overrepresented states’ ability to 
reproduce their leverage in legislative chambers onto key congressional budgetary committees in 
the latter country, whereas Argentine national executive directs disproportionate federal funding 
to small-sized and state-dependent peripheral provinces because these render substantial political 
payoffs (i.e., legislative support for hard-to-sell economic reforms) from relatively small 
investments of intergovernmental funds. In Belgium, increasing fiscal autonomy (including tax 
powers) is strongly associated with the necessity of promoting the visibility and influence of 
inchoate and recently (circa 1995) established regional governments (Van Houten 1999: 5).  
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 Examples from other federations and rapidly decentralizing countries (i.e., Colombia and Italy) 
can be cited at length but the above illustrations suffice to show the extent to which fiscal and 
financial issues give rise to political struggle between central and regional authorities. 
 
Yet, what makes fiscal decentralization particularly susceptible to political manipulation? As 
argued above, political decentralization is very much at the core of democratization processes, 
constituting a recurrent and unavoidable outcome. Oftentimes, local elected officials become 
standard-bearers of transitions processes (Nohlen 1991), and any reversal to their prerogatives 
stirs public outcry and consternation. In contrast, the unfolding of fiscal reforms and the 
distribution of federal grants is far less subject to citizen scrutiny and tends to take place in 
“smoke-filled” rooms28. Particularly so in countries such as Argentina and Spain whose 
respective intergovernmental fiscal systems are extremely complex even to enlightened 
bureaucrats (Agranoff and Gallarin 1997: 31-36; Saiegh and Tommasi 1999) However, the fact 
that elections of local officials have more profound symbolic undertones does not imply that the 
formulation and allocation of intergovernmental grants is something less of a political issue. On 
the contrary, and as this study attempts to show, when national politicians opt for reforming 
fiscal  power- sharing relations they do so with an eye to territorial  patterns of political and 
electoral support.  
 
                                                 
28  Additionally, “information-constrained” voters are less inclined to monitor local authorities 
due to the confounding impact of overlapping authority in decentralized systems (Rodden and 
Wibbels 2002: 498). 
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 Adding to the above is the fact that fiscal arrangements are only rarely enshrined in laws of 
constitutional status29. The ensuing rigidity stemming from constitutional mandates not only 
hinders governments’ maneuvering space to respond to fiscal crises in different ways (Cameron 
1984; Alvarez, Garrett and Lange 1991) but also affects their ability to attune fiscal policy to 
changing political environments. Because processes of decentralization often entail significant 
redrawing of political boundaries and dynamics, renegotiation of agreements becomes necessary. 
Moreover, some scholars argue that insofar as it promotes different interpretations, constitutional 
ambiguity ensures the durability of the system (Erk and Gagnon 2000). Yet, this study indicates 
that mutual trust among the different levels of governance is of essence and that Spain does not 
meet said requirement. Furthermore, the Achilles heel of the “para-constitutional” nature of these 
intergovernmental agreements, however, lies in the strategic advantage of a few participants with 
strong bargaining positions. While this pattern occurs in other decentralized systems like Canada, 
intergovernmental relations in Argentina and Spain unfold in a framework of low 
institutionalization and their agenda is set by the political leadership of the governing parties in a 
largely unmediated manner. 
 
The political nature of fiscal decentralization becomes also evident because there is no 
widespread agreement among policymakers on how to treat intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
On the one hand, central authorities offload fiscal functions to subnational governments at the 
face of budget constraints. However, recent experiences of countries experiencing 
macroeconomic crises like Argentina and Brazil indicate that central governments have sought to 
                                                 
29  Germany deviates from this “rule” insofar as its Basic Law of 1949 outlines the revenue shares 
from particular taxes accruing to different government levels and their distribution (Spahn and 
Föttinger 1997). 
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 re-centralize by imposing fiscal restraints on state governors (Eaton and Dickovick 2003). Let 
alone that party system changes prompted Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela to re-centralize.  
 
3.1.1 Conceptualizing the Politicization of Fiscal Decentralization: The Role 
of Transfers 
If the crux of intergovernmental politics lies in the realm of fiscal relations, what aspects are 
most important in determining the trajectory of these relations? In this section, we investigate the 
thesis that transfers are a key component of political models of central-regional relations. In 
considering the effect of transfers on decentralization, it is important to refer to an important 
body of literature on local budgetary behavior indicating that central funding undermines 
regional/local fiscal autonomy (Boaden 1970; Dearlove 1973). Autonomy, in this context, 
denotes the ability of subnational governments to raise tax locally to offset expenditures. More 
recently, however, it has been suggested that regional leaders may be less motivated to increase 
the tax burden in their jurisdictions because central government transfers minimize the costs of 
decentralized provision borne by local taxpayers, which can be financed by a “common pool” of 
resources collected elsewhere in the economy (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981). This view 
is reinforced by the presence of revenue-sharing arrangements, whereby every time a central 
government raises taxes to improve its own position, subnational governments receive a 
corresponding revenue benefit which they are normally free to spend.30
 
Intergovernmental transfers are the dominant source of revenue for most subnational 
governments in multitiered systems. Apart from federations like Canada, Switzerland and the 
                                                 
30  According to Thorlakson (2003: 6), “the centralization of public finances is an efficient 
indicator of the allocation of resources, or power”. 
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 United States, where emphasis is placed on local tax revenue mobilization, other countries have 
their subnational spending mostly financed by intergovernmental transfers.31 These transfers aim 
also to address fiscal gaps across regions, which are exacerbated by and stem from the 
insufficient revenue-generating capacity of subnational levels of government to meet their 
expenditure responsibilities. Adding to the distorting impact of separating taxing and spending 
powers, namely the “flypaper” effect32, are policies of fiscal decentralization based on unfunded 
mandates (Roin 1999), or, put simply, deficit-ridden central governments offload their 
imbalances onto state governments by increasing subnational expenditure without a parallel 
increase in revenues. These distortions do not only have fiscal significance but also pit the states 
and federal level against each other, buttressing the political significance of intergovernmental 
transfers. 
 
More specifically, federal intergovernmental funds comprise general revenue and specific 
purpose (i.e., conditional) transfers. The former, commonly known as coparticipation or revenue-
sharing system, is oftentimes ruled by variables such as population density, developmental gaps, 
and state own tax collection or alternatively by fixed coefficients over which central and regional 
powers have limited leverage. In this case, transfers are allocated automatically and are not 
earmarked for any specific purpose. Hence, the extent of potential politicization of this type of 
                                                 
31  Fiscal relations in the EU obscure this characterization, insofar as its budget is financed mainly 
through upward-oriented grants from its member governments, as opposed to the typical pattern 
of top-down flows. The European regional policy is one of the few instances in which 
subnational governments are funded by the “political center” through programs such as the 
European Fund for Regional Development.  
32  Also known as “fiscal illusion”, this effect denotes an underestimation of the costs of locally 
provided services, resulting in increased demands for local government output. This “inflation” 
of demands stems from the recipient’s perception that said services are being paid for or heavily 
subsidized by residents of other localities (Grossman 1990: 313-314). 
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 transfers is nearly negligible because the three afore-mentioned variables have little variance in 
the short-term and fixed coefficients remain constant, let alone that revenue-sharing is unlikely to 
be affected by the policy choices and actions of recipient governments. In contrast, conditional 
transfers are subject to ongoing processes of intergovernmental negotiation, furnishing 
subnational-level leaders with a maneuvering margin of considerable proportions to extract 
additional resources from the central administration. By the same token, the center may attempt 
to manipulate transfers to force subnational authorities to pursue economic policies in tandem 
with national programs of fiscal adjustment, amounting to a re-centralization of fiscal policies. In 
Argentina, severe fiscal constraints compelled provincial governments to allow the National 
Treasury as well as international banks to withhold coparticipation (i.e., unearmarked) income as 
a collateral for contracting loans. Thus, most provinces are deprived from using coparticipation 
monies during the first two weeks of the month. To mitigate said stringent conditions, provincial 
governors were allowed to redirect some of the earmarked (housing, highways, energy, etc.) 
funds to soothe mushrooming provincial fiscal deficits.33 Based on discretional criteria, this 
change has turned intergovernmental transfers into arenas of political manipulation. Comparable 
developments transpire in Spain, where Joint Agreements on Investment (Convenios de 
Inversión), the largest conditional intergovernmental transfer, are generally exploited by the 
central administration to adjust ACs expenditure priorities to national policies of economic 
stabilization (Monasterio Escudero and Suarez Pandiello 1998: 209). 
                                                 
33  For instance, since the mid-1990 the central government has agreed to permit provincial 
governments to use nearly 50 percent of FONAVI (Fondo Nacional de Viviendas, National 
Housing Fund) funds to cover general expenditure needs (Personal communication with Senior 
Advisor, Subsecreataria de Relaciones con Provincias, Ministerio de Economía, Under 
Secretariat of Provincial Affairs, July 28, 2001). It is worth mentioning that FONAVI is the 
largest intergovernmental grant, accounting for roughly 20 percent of the total amount of 
sharable resources in Argentina. 
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Focusing on intergovernmental transfers illuminates otherwise cryptic facts about the political 
nature of fiscal decentralization. As Bird and Vaillancourt (1998: 30) argue, “the design of 
intergovernmental transfers is always and everywhere an exercise not solely in normative 
economics but also in political economy”.  This is so because looking into the relative shares of 
revenues and expenditures held by subnational governments, as most studies on decentralization 
do, gives an incomplete picture of the real degrees of decentralization. A more nuanced and valid 
measure of regional fiscal autonomy, then, is the share of intergovernmental transfers in total 
subnational revenue, which taps the segment of subnational finance being determined by central 
government authorities. Although this indicator applies only to the apportionment between the 
central and the subnational governments (henceforth, primary distribution) and does not take into 
account the distribution among subnational governments (henceforth, secondary distribution), it 
is a useful starting point to establish the comparative context in which Argentina and Spain can 
be placed. Table 1 confirms that in these two countries there is an acute gap between the political 
sway of regions and their fiscal autonomy, when compared to a sample of federal and 
decentralized unitary systems in their respective regions (the U.S. data are used as a “shadow” 
case of highly decentralized fiscal relations). To illustrate this disparity, we constructed the Index 
of Fiscal Politicization, in which the magnitude of intergovernmental transfers is weighed up by 
the level of subnational spending as a proportion of total government spending (see, Table 1, 
footnote). This index has no fixed range and its substance is more of heuristic than of 
econometric nature, but its high values denote higher potential for political conflict over fiscal 
decentralization and lower values otherwise. The rationale for this indicator lies on the stylized 
fact that high reliance on central government transfers on the revenue side of the equation 
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 combined with increasing subnational expenditure responsibilities exacerbates the zero-sum 
character of fiscal relations and their political “corrosiveness”. Put differently, the higher the 
value of this index, the more intergovernmental bargaining will affect the inter-regional 
distribution of transfers. 
 
 
Table 3: INTERGOVERNMETAL FISCAL INDICATORS 
 
 Subnational Fiscal 
Dependency 
Subnational 
Spending Share 
Index of Fiscal 
Politicization 
                                    Average  St. Dev.     Average      St. Dev. 
 
Argentina 61.0           4.7      42.7               4.0       1.04 
Spain 51.2         18.3      38.0  17.0                     0.89 
Austria 26.3           3.5              30.8    0.9                     0.57 
Belgium 58.6            3.3      12.0    1.1                  0.71 
Brazil 34.4           2.1      37.3    3.8                     0.72 
Colombia 47.8           4.5      28.1    1.8                  0.76 
Germany 23.1           2.2      42.7    1.9                     0.66 
Sweden 24.6           1.9      39.4               3.7                  0.64 
Switzerland 23.3            1.6      54.4               2.2                     0.78 
United States 31.1           2.6      44.1    1.9       0.75 
Note: Subnational fiscal dependency is the share of intergovernmental transfers to subnational 
government total revenue. Subnational spending share is the ratio of subnational spending to 
total government spending. Index of Fiscal Politicization is the standardized summation of the 
Subnational Fiscal Dependency and Subnational Spending Share indicators. Data are drawn from 
the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics dataset and Fukasaku and de Mello Jr. (1998). 
Averages shown are from 1970 to 1995 for most countries. 
 
 
52 
 Against this background, an important theoretical qualification to be introduced here is about the 
real political significance of decentralized spending. In this regard, the evidence presented above 
suggests that high levels of subnational spending are not tantamount to regional fiscal 
sovereignty. Whereas studies using subnational spending as a degree of fiscal decentralization 
are correct in pointing out that this is one of the best measures available without detailed study of 
each country (Byskow in Schneider 2003), they fail to grasp that local expenditure is something 
of a “double-edged sword”. One the one hand, it highlights the amount of government activity 
that subnational governments undertake, tapping into one of the main aspects of decentralization. 
On the other, mere expenditure decentralization funded through intergovernmental transfers34 
renders local officials subservient to the priorities of the center, with the concomitant rent-
seeking effects (Oates 1993). In this context, it is worth emphasizing that while the classic public 
economics scholarship advocates that transfers are made by “free-handed” central governments 
to internalize externalities (i.e., interregional fiscal equalization), Rodden (2003: 705-706) 
correctly argues that, both from an institutional political economy and more realistic 
perspectives, “intergovernmental grants are not distributed by benevolent central planners, but 
rather by strategic politicians”. Hence, subnational governments get no “free lunch” when local 
expenditure is financed with transfers that normally carry political, if not administrative, strings 
attached. The case of Argentina is very telling insofar as it is not only the most decentralized 
Latin American country in expenditure terms (Inter-American Development Bank 1997)35 but, 
                                                 
34   Albeit excluded from this discussion, subnational independent borrowing is another important 
source of finance in multitiered systems, as state governments may borrow aggressively to adjust 
revenue shortfalls. The political significance of subnational borrowing is equally relevant for 
developed federations (Sbragia 1996). 
35  However, as the World Bank’s report by Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1998:11) claims, 
“Argentina is arguably one of the most decentralized countries in the region but has essentially 
the same political and fiscal structure it had before the military intervened in 1976….In contrast, 
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 also, one of the front-runners in Table 1, matching the United States and approaching 
Switzerland, which have some of the highest levels of decentralized spending in the world. 
However, the extent of politicization, as measured by our index, is considerably much higher in 
Argentina, suggesting that transfers are prone to be hijacked by political interests. 
What really matters, then, is the sphere over which state officials have autonomy. Ideally, local 
authorities can have more autonomy over tax bases of their own, but the “common pool” 
dynamics illustrated above boosts their preference to externalize the founding source (i.e., 
minimizing own revenue mobilization) to reduce accountability troubles in their electoral 
jurisdictions.36 Put differently, if the political costs of “self-control” offset administrative and 
efficiency gains derived from own-revenue mobilization, local authorities will rather choose to 
maximize “influence”. This sway can be materialized in the determination of the revenue-sharing 
allocation to be transferred to subnational governments and in the redistribution of transfers 
among them. With regards to the former, the determination of how much is to be distributed is 
usually a fixed proportion of central government total revenues, which is more heavily 
influenced by economic trends such as pro-cyclical effects than by political interferences.37 
Furthermore, revenue-sharing arrangements are more commonly set on a tax-by-tax basis, with 
different coefficients of distribution among levels of government for each tax, rather on the 
entire pool of central government taxes, as found in Argentina, Brazil, Germany, India, Spain, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Colombia has radically increased the power and responsibilities of subnational units of 
government”. It is noteworthy that the index of fiscal politicization ranks Argentina much higher 
than Colombia. 
36  Likewise, some public choice scholars go as far as to argue that intergovernmental transfers 
undercut incentives for fiscal efforts, encouraging the formation of subnational cartels to avoid 
the discipline of tax competition (Grossman and West in Rodden 2003). 
37  Examples of revenue-sharing systems that determine transfers as a proportion of national 
current revenues may be found in developed and developing countries alike. These include 
Austria, Brazil, Colombia, India, Japan, Nigeria, Philippines and others (Bird and Vaillancourt 
1998: 30). 
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 and others. This scheme, however, is detrimental to subnational governments because it leads the 
central level over time to tend to increase those taxes which they do not have to share (Ter-
Minassian 1997: 11-12).  
 
3.1.1.1 Types of Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Explanation 
While state-level authorities have limited capacity to dictate the total volume of revenue-sharing, 
they have more influence on the primary and secondary distribution of earmarked transfers 
(Porto 1986). In this regard, decentralization should be seen not only as a game being played 
between the central government and the regions but also as an issue subject to inter-state 
conflict.38 The rationale for this analytical strategy stems from the fact that, whereas federal 
transfers are important to all subnational units, the greater dependence of peripheral regions on 
the central government alters the parameters used to assess levels of decentralization. This 
dependency results from the greater share of said disadvantaged regions’ budgets subsidized by 
intergovernmental transfers, compared to metropolitan areas. Thus, while the apportionment of 
federal transfers to individual metropolitan areas may exceed that for peripheral regions in 
absolute terms, the purse power granted to the latter is more significant in relative terms. 
Moreover, in countries traditionally seen as playgrounds of caudillos, dictators and strongmen 
like Argentina and Spain (Veliz 1980), centralist legacies transpire in the ongoing administrative 
and political hegemony of Buenos Aires and Madrid, respectively. In turn, this sway endows 
politically powerful regions with privileged access to fiscal resources, beyond their actual 
                                                 
38  Gibson and Falleti (2000) also emphasize the need to integrate inter-provincial conflict into 
explanations of the institutional centralization in federal systems. The literature on federalism 
and decentralization, including Riker’s seminal theory of federalism, tend to overlook the 
explanatory role of inter-provincial domination in multitiered systems. 
55 
 economic capability and despite the concomitant de facto separation of national political power 
from regional economic power.39
 
Consequently, we argue that the apportionment of federal transfers among subnational units is a 
most valid and sound indicator of real fiscal decentralization, providing a number of important 
insights into the political economy of multitiered polities. Furthermore, focusing on the 
secondary distribution of intergovernmental transfers allows us to knit together the fate of 
decentralization policies to the maintenance of state patronage. Despite the prevalent view, 
mostly from international financial institutions, of fiscal decentralization as a potent antidote 
against rent-seeking behavior, this policy arena renders substantial opportunities to reinforce 
established clientelist networks in the economically disadvantaged but politically relevant 
subnational units. In economic terms, this analytical divide between metropolitan and peripheral 
regions affects substantially the political economy of transfers because higher levels of 
development and economic prosperity in the former regions will boost their capacity to mobilize 
revenue locally. Thus, all else equal, transfers in said areas will amount to a smaller fraction of 
their public budget. However, the extent of peripheralization of transfers is also influenced by the 
leverage of political factors, as opposed to socio-demographic and economic ones, in the 
determination of the primary distribution of earmarked transfers. This argument is presented 
visually in Figure1, which identifies four ideal-typical scenarios of fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
                                                 
39   In Argentina, the development of the Pampas region has, from the very beginning, enhanced 
the economic and administrative clout of city of Buenos Aires, whose ports gave it virtually 
unchallenged control over trade and customs revenues. The case of Spain bears resemblance in 
the standing of Madrid as the “center”, notwithstanding the economic strength of Catalonia.  
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Figure 1: TYPES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
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The horizontal axis measures the extent to which the allocation of federal transfers is tilted to 
more transfer-dependent subnational units, composing a variable identified as peripheralization 
of secondary distribution. The vertical axis measures the extent to which the total amount of 
earmarked transfers is politically determined, namely whether the bargaining among politicians 
and the political ideology of the party in power federally are more decisive than fiscal criteria in 
said determination, identified as political determination of grants. On average, this typology 
shows that the equalizing and efficiency effects that fiscal decentralization policies aim to 
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 achieve are increased when the determination of transfers fits the lower right quadrant, which 
corresponds to the cooperative decentralization type. The afore-mentioned clause of the German 
Grundgesetz (Constitution) requiring “equivalence of living conditions” implies that inter-
regional welfare imperatives prevail over political considerations. Further, poor Länder are 
subsidized by an equalization scheme pursued through direct horizontal redistribution among 
Länder, without participation of the central government (Spahn and Föttinger 1997). 
Accordingly, constitutionally-determined outcomes prevail. In practice, this translates into what 
Börzel (2002) describes as “compensation-through-participation”, whereby all Länder share the 
adaptational costs through codetermination in fiscal decision-making. However, if the 
apportionment of transfers to peripheral regions is a function of the grantee’s ability to deliver 
votes or legislative support to central government’s policies, grants are more likely to be 
perceived as contractually established. This scenario, identified in the upper right quadrant as 
cooptative decentralization, is perhaps less desirable from a normatively-oriented fiscal 
federalism perspective, but it may be appealing to transfers-dependent regions. Note that 
Argentina has not only one of the world’s most malapportioned senates but also the most 
malapportioned lower chamber in Latin America (Samuels and Snyder 2001). This 
overrepresentation renders poor peripheral units politically powerful because these can offer 
more “political bang for the buck” to the national executive than underrepresented areas. Utility-
maximizing central governments prefer to target transfers to disadvantaged regions rather than to 
more developed constituencies because they obtain substantial political payoffs from smaller 
investments in “political” spending (Gibson and Calvo 2000).40 The correlate of this standpoint 
                                                 
40  This conjecture naturally assumes that national political power is more or less equally 
distributed among constituent units in a politically-decentralized system and that poor and 
unpopulated units are oftentimes overrepresented in national legislatures of federal systems. 
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 is peripheral subnational governments’ keenness to secure a lavish flow of federal transfers, as 
their political survival hinges upon them to a larger extent than prosperous regions, where both 
economic clout and organizational resources are more readily available.41 Thus, this type of 
decentralization, which is based on institutional resources and their consequential biases, 
engenders a more predictable and reliable flow of transfer funds to said regions.  
 
The upper left quadrant, however, indicates that political factors can twist transfers toward more 
developed, metropolitan regions. The rationale underlying this collaborative42 type of fiscal 
decentralization is that central governments would reward highly populated, i.e. revenue-rich, 
subnational units, which are more “regionally assertive” (Van Houten 2000), more likely to 
develop regionalist political forces and, thus, more prone to advance their region’s fiscal 
autonomy. Partly aimed at rewarding fiscal performance and partly due to the embryonic and 
evolving nature of fiscal federalism in Spain, the central government started first bilateral 
consultations and negotiation with Basques and Catalans, which virtually play a gate-keeper role 
(Aja 1999: 214-15) and gradually incorporated all other regions in multilateral arrangements. 
                                                 
41  Federations furnish developed regions with channels to assert their economic sway whereby 
they may circumvent the central state. In Argentina, provinces are constitutionally entitled to 
establish international trade agreements without interference from the central administration. The 
Spanish case bears resemblance insofar as AC have access to EU-lead forums such as the 
Committee of Regions in Brussels. In both instances, better-off regions can exploit more 
effectively these institutional prerogatives. Organizationally speaking, metropolitan regions have 
normally a more developed (i.e., more unionized and, thus, susceptible to exacerbate class 
conflict) workforce than peripheral regions, creating a more contested political environment 
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986). 
42   The term collaborative is used to denote a lower level of co-decision powers in the 
formulation and representation of subnational interests than in the more entrenched and 
institutionalized cooperative type. Borrowed from Painter (1998), who couched the former term 
to portray the Australian intergovernmental policy process, the collaborative type involves the 
creation of joint schemes of administration and authoritative intergovernmental and consultative 
bodies. In this respect, collaboration is more affected by bilateral dynamics and thus can be seen 
as a preceding phase to full-fledged cooperation. 
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 Last, transfers can benefit more developed regions, inasmuch as these are “net-payers” (due to 
the relatively high level of personal income tax generated in their jurisdiction), hence worthy of 
some sort of compensation for their fiscal contributions. This approach, which is widespread in 
the United States, shifts emphasis away from redistributive calculus and it prioritizes the removal 
of distortions in the allocation of federal transfers.43 Identified as competitive decentralization in 
the lower left quadrant, this policy rewards fiscal efforts of competent fiscal contributors and 
cuts back support for local tax administration in peripheral regions, where it is perceived to 
generate major revenue bottlenecks. In turn, this type of decentralization hinges on the 
development and protection of markets (Weingast 1995). 
 
In summary, considering that the territorial impact of federal transfers is gauged in relative 
terms, as suggested above, transfers that further peripheral subnational governments’ spending 
power, relative to metropolitan regions, will bring about a type of decentralization that is 
qualitatively different from one resulting from an advantageous apportionment to metropolitan 
regions. The major policy-making implication of this crossroads of central 
government/peripheral areas’ preferences is that a meaningful articulation of subnational 
interests is precluded, considering the underlying zero-sum game’ character of said distribution 
of federal transfers. We argue that this competitive environment renders two major structural 
effects on fiscal decentralization; first, negotiations are based on bilateral bargaining that clearly 
dilutes the formation of subnational coalitions and, second, intergovernmental negotiation occurs 
mostly through ad hoc meetings between the executive levels of the governing parties, to the 
                                                 
43   In the United States, approximately half of the categorical (i.e. earmarked) grants require 
matching funds from the state and local governments, regardless of fiscal capacity considerations 
(Stotsky and Sunley 1997: 371). 
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 detriment of any meaningful parliamentary processes of scrutiny. As it will be more carefully 
elaborated in chapters 3 and 4, these structural features hinder a redressing of the territorial 
balance of resources that fiscal decentralization policies are meant to achieve. These effects are 
more pervasive in Argentina than in Spain, where there has been a shift from confrontation and 
non-cooperation (between the central government and AC, on the one hand, and among AC, on 
the other) to a more cooperative approach based on an institutional framework that promotes 
multilateral cooperation. 
.  
3.1.1.1.1 LOOKING AHEAD 
This chapter has shown that the design and working of intergovernmental transfers is a most 
appropriate analytical lense to uncover the political dynamics of fiscal decentralization. Further, 
we dealt with the sources of politicization of fiscal decentralization policies, suggesting that 
extant approaches fall short of revealing some ambiguous aspects of these policies. Particularly, 
the weakness of conventional measures of fiscal decentralization to capture nuanced facts about 
the inter-state level of conflict and the apparent, yet paradoxical, mutually reinforcing 
relationship between decentralization and the proliferation of patronage-ridden policy regimes in 
peripheral regions. What is more, the theory laid out in this chapter suggests that state patronage 
is not only a likely development but also that it is apparently a causally integral component of the 
overarching fiscal decentralization policies.  This conjecture takes the center stage in the next 
two chapters, where we use empirical analysis to further investigate this theory in Argentina and 
Spain, respectively. In specific terms, the core question is what political features and/or 
institutional incentives of the system determine the afore-described manipulation of 
intergovernmental financing across subnational jurisdictions. Chief among these features and 
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 incentives are the legislative representation of territorial interests, partisan color of the national 
executive and governorships, presence of regional-party dominant systems, socio-demographic 
influences, macroeconomic determinants, which are treated as independent variables. 
Subsequently, we will trace the paths of fiscal decentralization in Argentina and Spain to flesh 
out ambiguous, yet important, facts about these trajectories and to account for the causal impact 
of other political and fiscal influences. This qualitatively-oriented analysis aims to throw some 
light on particular dynamics that are not captured in the statistical test. 
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4 Chapter 4:  The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Argentina: 
Time-series and Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
At first glance, Argentina appears to have one of the most decentralized fiscal systems in the 
world. According to an Inter-American Development Bank Report (1997), provinces spend more 
than 50 percent of total national and provincial expenditures. Yet, since the 1930s, subnational 
governments in Argentina have delegated fiscal authority to the federal level, which collects 
most taxes. This structural imbalance between expenditure and revenue assignments is common 
among federal systems, inasmuch as revenue-sharing arrangements are commonplace. However, 
Argentine provinces receive transfers that are, for the most part, substantially larger than own-tax 
revenues.44 These transfers, as already outlined in Chapter 2, are drawn from the revenue-sharing 
system (coparticipación or Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement, FTSA) and other automatic 
transfers that are earmarked for specific purposes. The levels and parameters of these transfers 
have varied substantially over time, constituting an ongoing source of political strife between 
federal and provincial levels authorities and, as we will demonstrate in this chapter, among the 
provinces themselves. 
 
Argentina’s experience with fiscal decentralization stands out as important case for comparative 
theories about decentralization, as this country underwent processes of democratization and 
economic liberalization in tandem with decentralizing reforms at different times. Democratic 
election of subnational offices has unleashed pressure to deepen fiscal decentralization because 
local authorities sought to maximize control over resources that affect their lot.  Additionally, 
                                                 
44  By the mid-1980s, subnational administrations (including the municipal level) collected less 
than 15 percent of the total taxes collected in Argentina (Piffano in Sawers 1996: 218). 
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 democratization sets free institutional factors such as political parties and legislative politics, 
which are seen as causally linked to decentralization policies (Willis, Garman and Haggard 
1999). The effect of economic liberalization, however, is more multifaceted. Eaton (2001: 4) 
argues that in Argentina is necessary to separate the expenditure and revenue side of the 
question. On the one hand, liberalization in Argentina boosted expenditure decentralization, be it 
to pass on unwanted fiscal burden on central government accounts to lower levels or just simply 
based on the Tieboutian assumption that localized spending is more fiscally efficient. On the 
other hand, liberalizing, anti-statist plans pushed centralization of revenue, based on the 
presumption that tax-collection by central government officials is more competent, because this 
level of government attracts highly trained people through higher salaries (Tanzi 2002: 23). This 
coexistence of apparently inconsistent trends highlights the extent to which influential theories 
on the politics of economic liberalization fall short of elucidating the interaction among levels 
and regions that comprise the Argentine political system. 
 
4.1 The Argentine “Paradox”: Federalism, Political Spending and Fiscal 
Crises 
Argentina in the early years of the twentieth century was one of the most affluent nations in the 
world. The per capita income was on a par with West European countries such as France and 
Germany and matched those of Australia and Canada. In contrast, while many economies 
experienced exceptional growth after the World War II, Argentina has grown erratically, with 
long periods of stagnation and recession. This economic decay has been attributed to the pursuit 
of populist macroeconomic policies, which dwindled fiscal imperatives and prioritized the 
expansion of state capacities (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991).  
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 Despite these gloomy circumstances, Argentina got through several economic crises and 
managed to overcome unprecedented hyperinflation in the early 1990s by means of policies of 
economic adjustment that restored Argentina’s credibility in world markets.  These 
accomplishments notwithstanding, the financial crisis in 1995 had a profound impact on the 
evolution of the public provincial sector. Out of 24 provinces, only 4 generated savings to 
finance investment; the few capital investitures made were financed partly by earmarked 
transfers (43 percent) and partly by borrowing (World Bank 1996: i). However, and reversing the 
direction of causality, Argentina presents an interesting case where the imbalances in the 
intergovernmental relations have contributed directly to macroeconomic collapse. Insulated from 
international pressures and institutionally powerful, “subnational politicians in Argentina have 
thus demonstrated a capacity not only to mire their own governmental units in debt and 
mismanagement, but collectively to threaten the adjustment policies of the nation as a whole 
(Remmer and Wibbels 2000: 445). 
 
Under the Argentine Constitution, provinces have the right to borrow and set up their own 
official banks, thus making the provinces the main locus of spending decisions. While in theory 
federalism is conducive to fiscal prudence in countries such as the United States (Weingast 
1995), it is difficult to ignore that the political sway of Argentine provinces fostered 
macroeconomic volatility rather than fiscal discipline. Amounting to veto players in economic 
adjustment policies, regional politicians are institutionally endowed to extract resources from the 
center with little concern for the potential impact of their economic decisions on the federation as 
a whole. More specifically, observers of Argentina’s political economy have shown that its 
regime of federal transfers induces an over-spending bias across jurisdictions as each province 
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 tries to overuse the national common source of funds (Jones et al 2000). Adding to the 
expansionary bias that is being generated by the system of intergovernmental grants are soft 
budget constraints that manifest themselves in national government’s bail outs of regional 
borrowing and debts.  The result is a critically weakened center that resorts to federal transfers to 
buy off political support but unable to pursue intergovernmental reforms aimed at improving its 
capacity to provide national public goods. This chapter therefore seeks to analyze the role of 
subnational politics on the “enigma” of Argentine economic development. 
 
4.1.1 Understanding the Role of Political and Economic Factors in 
Argentine Intergovernmental Relations 
The task of this case study is to examine the political and economic underpinnings of fiscal 
decentralization in Argentina, paying special attention to the distribution of intergovernmental 
transfers. This case study shows that the political tinkering behind fiscal decentralization policies 
can be grasped more precisely when we examine the distribution of seemingly small-scale 
grants. Previous studies have used the history of Argentine FTSA to explore for evidence of the 
relative effect of economic and political factors on fiscal decentralization (Eaton 2001). 
However, while FTSA funds are not earmarked and local politicians can use them to build 
independent patronage networks, the bulk of money was given out on a formula or fixed 
coefficients basis. Further, after the 1973 restructuring of revenue sharing, FTSA increasingly 
lost ground (in relative terms) to other revenue-sharing funds that target specific purposes. 45 In 
this vein, this case study will focus on three intergovernmental transfers programs, FONAVI 
(Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda, National Housing Fund), FEDEI (Fondo de Desarrollo 
                                                 
45  Although FTSA allocations, which are automatic, have been subject to periodical revisions 
based on political calculations (Saiegh and Tommassi 1999), there is some preliminary empirical 
evidence on the limited significance of FTSA as a determinant of actual levels of fiscal 
decentralization in Argentina (Gordin forthcoming). 
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 Eléctrico del Interior, Electricity Investment Development Fund), and ATN (Aportes del Tesoro 
Nacional, National Treasury Contributions). This case selection is based on the fact that these 
funds are based on discretionary transfers, as opposed to automatic ones that are less vulnerable 
to political influence. However, while FONAVI and FEDEI are ideally allocated with the 
purpose of financing housing construction and electricity provision infrastructure respectively, 
ATN is used to fill financing gaps, thus is based on discretionary criteria both in the 
determination of the total amount to be transferred and unconditional with respect to allocation. 
Focusing on these funds, therefore, allows us to analyze the effect of explanatory political and 
economic factors on subnational funds apportionment under diverse transfer regimes. 
 
4.1.1.1 FONAVI 
Established in 1972 with the explicit purpose of financing underprivileged social sectors to 
defray costs to acquire housing and finance small-scale housing construction, FONAVI is the 
most important revenue-sharing fund after FTSA, accounting for roughly 20 percent, on average, 
of the total sharable resources. Over time, this fund underwent significant budgetary expansion, 
much larger than that experienced by comparable transfer programs in Argentina. According to 
FIEL (1993: 159), while FTSA experienced nearly 100 percent increase in the total transfers to 
provincial governments from 1974 to 1990, FONAVI underwent almost a 400 percent increase 
throughout the same period of time. This expansion of FONAVI suggests that both central and 
provincial administrations favor this fund over automatic transfers, considering that both levels 
prefer to have more influence over apportionment. 46
 
                                                 
46  Personal communication with a Senior Advisor, Subsecreataria de Relaciones con Provincias, 
Ministerio de Economía, Under Secretariat of Provincial Affairs, July 28, 2001. 
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 In general terms, the incidence of FONAVI funds on the overall level of house construction is 
very high, particularly, but not exclusively, in poor provinces (INDEC 1994). These funds are 
lent to the provinces, which then onlend funds through provincial housing organizations to needy 
individuals to bankroll housing construction. It is noteworthy that while FONAVI resources have 
to be paid back in principle, the income recovered from outstanding housing loans has only been 
between 2 and 4 percent in 1978-1993 (World Bank 1993: 128). Adding to this low repayment 
levels, Schwartz and Liuskilla (1997: 403) argue that “FONAVI does not reach the very poor, 
and, in fact, it has evolved into a mechanism for subsidizing middle-class housing”. This 
apparent unruly background hints that they might be other aspects of FONAVI that make it more 
subservient to political and regional influence than to its ostensible goal. 47
 
4.1.1.1.1 FEDEI 
Created in 1960, FEDEI operates as a subsidy, which is not repayable to the federal government, 
to provinces to organize cooperatives to promote and organize electrification public works. 
These cooperatives undertake works mostly in rural area, which are distant from power 
distribution grids and away from major urban centers that normally receive electricity services 
from major providers. Considering that FEDEI-related cooperatives supply almost 20 percent of 
the total national provision of electricity, its incidence on the energy sector is considerable 
(Ambito Financiero, April 15, 1999). Beyond its valuable social function, FEDEI is driven by 
                                                 
47   Lopez Murphy and Moskovits (1999: 127) claim that the mechanism of federal transfers in 
Argentina leads to moral hazard for local officials and, more specifically, “when funds are 
transferred for specific programmes (e.g. conditional transfers such as FONAVI or other health 
or education programmes) get diverted to general funds and then are spent in other, politically 
profitable ways (e.g. temporary jobs for potential supporters or simply deficit reduction). The 
central government cannot immediately detect if this has an effect on local government’s 
housing, health or education budget, nor can it legally prevent it unless legally or constitutionally 
authorized”. 
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 pork-barreling priorities set by provincial governments, which have the last word in the 
distribution criteria. The cooperative structure, whose organization is highly impromptu and 
informal, opens further opportunities for clientelist practices through public contracts that 
oftentimes are awarded to governor’s “friends”. Further, despite the fact that provinces have 
ample discretionary authorities to set FEDEI priorities, there is no shortage of conflicts among 
provinces from overlapping jurisdictions. For instance, neighboring Córdoba and San Luis are 
interconnected but bitter disputes took place because the latter province had its FEDEI 
cooperatives bearing much higher costs. In Santa Cruz, which was the only province 
unconnected from the national electricity network until recently, FEDEI transfers have been 
consistently high, ranking among the most critical revenue transfers to that province.   These 
outlay differentials are not divorced from governors’ ability to negotiate with the federal 
government their share of FEDEI.48
 
4.1.1.1.1.1 ATN 
Drawing its mandate from the article 67 of the Argentine National Constitution of 1853, ATN is 
the oldest intergovernmental transfer fund. Until the establishment of FTSA in 1935, ATN were 
the sole transfer avenue from the central government to provinces (Cetrangolo and Jimenez 
1997: 9). This datum has more than historical significance, and it highlights the discretionary 
character that the Argentine “Founding Fathers” have conferred to this country’s 
intergovernmental fiscal system.49 In terms of governance, this means that the Ministry of 
                                                 
48   Personal communication with a former Subsecreatario de Relaciones Fiscales con 
Provincias, Ministerio de Economía, Under Secretary of Provincial Affairs, July 30, 2001. 
 
49   Article 67 (paragraph 8) establishes that, de “acordar subsidios del Tesoro Nacional a las 
provincias cuyas rentas no alcancen, segun sus presupuestos, a cubrir sus gastos ordinaries”, i.e. 
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 Interior, which is in charge of allocating ATN, has had free hands to determine the allocation of 
funds to provincial administrations. While ATN allocations are consistently smaller than 
FONAVI transfers, oftentimes the former fund constituted the main avenue to channel transfers 
to the provinces. As Schwartz and Liuskilla (1997: 403) claim, “particularly in the early 1980s, 
when the funds channeled through the coparticipation arrangement were reduced via pre-
coparticipation arrangements, the provinces began to rely more heavily on discretionary ATN 
transfers to fill financing gaps. In 1983, for example, ATN transfers exceeded coparticipation 
transfers by 75 percent”. Furthermore, the share of provincial revenues coming from ATN 
transfers has grown by an annual average of 30 percent between 1991 and 1995, accounting for 
3.8 percent of total transfers to provinces in 1995 (World Bank 1996, Vol. 1: 34).  
 
This seemingly insignificant figure suggests that ATN are a small portion of total transfers. 
However, ATN transfers represent a large share of the revenue for some selected provinces. 
Even though the Debt Crisis in 1982 has caused to increase the amount of ATN transfers to all 
provinces, peripheral provinces experienced an increase of 140 percent compared to a 17 percent 
increase in economically-advanced provinces (Porto 1986: 23). What is more, in one notorious 
extreme case, the province of La Rioja, ATN transfers have accounted, in selected years, for over 
40 percent of the provincial government resources (World Bank 1996, Vol. 1: 66). 50 In Cordoba, 
a more developed yet similarly deficit-ridden province, ATN funds amounted only to 2.6 percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
“ATN will be transferred to provinces whose revenue is insufficient, based on their own 
budgetary forecasts, to offset ordinary expenses” (Anales de Legislación Argentina 1977: 10-11). 
50   It is noteworthy that La Rioja has reached this 40 percent in the 1990s, right after former 
President Carlos Menem, who achieved national standing as a populist governor of this province, 
won the 1989 presidential elections. Throughout the 1980s, ATN transfers accounted, on 
average, only for 6 percent of total provincial resources in La Rioja (Cetrángolo and Jimenez 
1997: 30). 
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 of total provincial resources during the 1990s, a period in which this province was so indebted 
that almost 40 percent of its coparticipación funds were retained to pay debt service. This inter-
provincial gap, which is at odds with ATN’s alleged goal of assisting ALL indebted provinces, 
becomes even more apparent when we observe that, during the 1990s, La Rioja attracted almost 
50 percent of the total amount of ATN allocated to all provinces, whereas Cordoba has been 
allocated only 1.4 percent throughout the same period (Subsecretaría de Programación Regional 
1998). 
 
Last, it is very telling that the agency in charge of managing ATN is the Ministry of Interior, 
whose modus operandum is highly political, compared to more technocratic (and germane to 
fiscal imperatives) offices such as the Ministry of Finance or Economics. Also, extraordinary 
political events may have a significant effect on ATN distribution. For instance, after the 
province of Corrientes was intervened by the central government in 1992, there has been a steep 
increase in ATN funding to said province, from 3.1 percent of total ATN allocations in 1991 to 
15.4 percent in 1993. Likewise, the intervention of Santiago del Estero in 1993 entailed an 
increase from 1.2 percent in 1992 to almost 6 percent in 1994 (Cetrángolo and Jimenez 1997: 
31).51  This suggests that ATN may be oftentimes be used as a politically-expedient tool by 
central government authorities to enhance support or encourage compliance at the face of 
unilateral and authoritarian moves such as said interventions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51  Further, considering that there are 24 ATN-hungry provinces in Argentina, the relative weight 
of these percentage increases becomes more palpable. 
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 4.1.1.1.1.1.1 The Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we assess the explanatory power of the typology of fiscal decentralization laid out 
in the previous chapter by means of statistical analysis and insights from policy informants and 
secondary sources. The first task is to examine the extent to which FONAVI and ATN 
allocations are politically determined, confronting two competing views about intergovernmental 
transfers.52 One explanation emphasizes the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-
subnational fiscal relations and the alternative model suggests that transfers are contingent on the 
political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. For that 
purpose, regression analysis is used to account for cross-subnational and diachronic variation in 
the distribution of intergovernmental transfers, using macroeconomic, socio-demographic and 
political indicators as explanatory factors. The second part lays out the circumstances and details 
of the inter-provincial distribution of federal transfers, using cross-sectional analysis of FEDEI 
allocations in 1995. This year, as we will show more thoroughly later, amounts to a “critical 
juncture” in the federal-provincial fiscal relations, following the fall of the Convertibility Plan, 
the Mexican (“Tequila”) crisis, and two Federal Fiscal Pacts (1992 and 1993). 
 
4.1.1.1.1.1.1.1 Benevolent Central Planners or Strategic Politicians?: The 
Determination of Federal Transfers, Argentine Style 
 
The theoretical framework for this analysis consists of a set of hypotheses positing relationships 
among these independent variables and the subnational allocations of FONAVI and ATN 
                                                 
52   In this analysis, we exclude FEDEI because it has been subjected to numerous changes since 
its creation, affecting the consistency of its time-series. However, FEDEI provides the most 
appropriate empirical indicator to analyze the cross-section distribution in the 1995 crisis, as it 
was put through intense media and oversight scrutiny based on its salient capital-intensive 
character (Zapata 1998). 
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 grants.53 This dependent variable measures the annual apportionment of these funds to provincial 
administrations from 1972 to 2000. This time frame does not relate to any theoretical 
consideration and is dictated by the availability of comparable and uniform data for only these 
years. That having been said, this is the longest time-series ever used to study the unfolding of 
fiscal decentralization in Argentina.54 In the case of FONAVI, a variable to analyze the extent to 
which these transfers are actually used for housing assistance purposes is included. In this vein, 
we have collected census data on the total yearly amount of new houses built that are financed by 
public monies. 55 Ideally, there should be a significant positive correlation between the amount of 
FONAVI transfers to a province and the total amount of publicly subsidized new houses built in 
that province in the corresponding year. 56 Appendix 2 provides a list of data sources used to 
compile all variables. 
 
We have chosen to test the hypotheses using pooled time-series regression analysis, which is the 
most appropriate technique for capturing variation across and within panels (Wonnacot and 
Wonnacot 1979) while using an estimator that recognizes the potential errors attributable to 
panels of subnational financial data. Chief among them is the statistical problem of serial 
correlation because budget allocations for one year are only incrementally different from 
previous years, so that the independence of observations requirement does not hold. Further, 
considering the data used in this analysis are unbalanced (i.e. a small numbers of years are 
                                                 
53   We specifically look at the secondary distribution of grants because the central government is 
not a recipient of these funds 
54  Previous studies use small data sets with cross-section averages for only 5 years (Stein 1998) 
or time-series for a period of 12 years (Rezk 1998). 
55   Because there is no alternative or competing national housing fund, we can confidently 
associate FONAVI to this census information. 
56    Funds are usually channeled before works, so, as we will see thereafter in the statistical 
analysis, it is necessary to lag this effect. 
73 
 missing), we use STATA software, which provides a command (“xtpcse”) that employs an 
algorithm to estimate unbalanced data. An additional advantage of using regression models with 
panel-corrected standard errors is that they prevent cross-sectional heteroskedasticity57 without 
substantially diminishing degrees of freedom. Last, given the reasonably large number of cross-
section units (24 provinces), it is not necessary to include a matrix of case dummies. 58 As we use 
pooled data, the unit of analysis is province/year. 
 
Competing Hypotheses 
1) The Economic Context
The traditional economic policy view of intergovernmental transfers is that such grants are made 
to enhance macroeconomic efficiency and fiscal equalization among provinces (Gramlich 1977; 
Oates 1972). This approach sees central government agents as “benevolent” insofar as they 
prioritize the advancement of public welfare over their private (i.e. political and utility-
maximizing) interest. In principle, government seeks to offset externalities and other market 
imperfections, thus it aims to match grants to jurisdictional needs and capabilities. This section, 
therefore, explores the ways in which these imperatives may come to be crucial in determining 
cross-provincial variation in the distribution of transfers. 
 
                                                 
57  Regression analysis is biased when all the error processes do not have the same variance (i.e. 
heteroskedasticity). 
58   Commonly used to analyze pooled time-series data, least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
regression is useful only when cross-temporal variances and covariances significantly exceed 
cross-spatial ones (Hicks 1994: 179). 
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 HYPOTHESIS 1:  Provinces with higher population share will receive larger amounts of 
FONAVI transfers than less populated provinces. However, the former will not necessarily 
receive larger amounts of ATN transfers than the latter. 
 
The distribution of funds across provinces is determined using various indicators reflecting the 
evolution of the demand for public services. Population is then a critical consideration in this 
regard. Further, population needs to be included in this analysis because is the crucial factor for 
allocating the amount of legislators in the low chamber representing each province, thus it 
indirectly affects the ebb and flow of transfers. Basically a demand-driven program, FONAVI is 
directly affected by population figures. While there is apparently a linear and positive 
relationship between FONAVI allocations and housing needs, it can be argued that other 
macroeconomic conditions affect this relationship. For instance, provincial unemployment levels 
are relevant because individuals who have no income are unlikely to take on mortgage 
commitments and would probably reside in rented housing. Hence, we should control for the 
impact of unemployment, which it will be subsequently analyzed in the next hypothesis. 
However, ATN are allocated to help provinces with a wide range of fiscal difficulties, thus 
populations may not be among the ultimate factors. Also, preliminary evidence (1973-84) on 
ATN transfers indicates that these contributions have been far more redistributive toward the 
underdeveloped provinces, some of them with low population density and some not (CECE 
1997: 153). This variable is measured using population figures based on available census data. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Provinces with high levels of unemployment will seek to offset their 
disadvantaged position with higher transfers of FONAVI and ATN funds 
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As indicated above, unemployment is included to control for the existence of an active counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, which might be at the core of demands for greater intergovernmental 
transfers. Considering that levels of unemployment tend to diverge dramatically across Argentine 
provinces59, it is important to see whether they demarcate the manner in which FONAVI and 
ATN transfers are doled out. Unemployment is measured as the provincial unemployment rate in 
percentages. 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Provinces with higher geographical GDP will receive higher FONAVI 
transfers. However, the former provinces will not necessarily receive higher ATN transfers. 
 
Provincial own revenue is usually positively related to the value of the regional economic 
capacity, generally measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). The availability of 
relatively reliable data on regional GDP allows us to test the impact of this variable on the 
distribution of intergovernmental transfers. Previous work on fiscal performance of Argentine 
provinces shows that energy consumption, a factor often used as a proxy for economic 
development, does not have any significant effect on provincial public sector spending (Jones et 
al 2000). However, provincial economic capacity bolsters demand for housing, thus we expect a 
significant relationship between provincial GDP and FONAVI transfers. In the case of FONAVI, 
considering that provincial debt stock is at variance with GDP (Jimenez and Devoto 2002: 231), 
                                                 
59   For instance, the unemployment rate (1995, randomly selected) in Mendoza is 6.7 percent 
compared to a 19.2 percent in Tucuman (INDEC). 
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 we do not anticipate any significant effect. Geographical GDP is measured as the per capita 
provincial GDP converted into Pesos, June 1995.  
 
2) The Political Context 
Arguments under this rubric hold that utility-maximizing politicians will use intergovernmental 
transfers to advance their own private (political) interests, thus questions of efficiency and social 
welfare are surface phenomena. Instead, one must understand the incentives politicians at all 
levels of government face and the resulting political relationships between national and 
subnational politicians. These incentives stem from electoral institutions, party competition, and 
most fundamentally, coalition-building. That is, intergovernmental bargaining in the political 
market takes the center stage. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: Provinces where the governor is from the same party as the president will 
have lower transfers of FONAVI and ATN transfers than provinces where the governor is a 
member of the opposition. 
 
In a widely cited study, Riker and Schaps (1957) argued that if the executive officials of the 
central and constituent governments are controlled by the same party, then they might be 
expected to attenuate the level of conflict within a federation by enhancing centralizing moves. 
In turn, whether governors belong to a political party which is similar or different to that of the 
president is a major influence in the unfolding of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In the 
Argentine context, governorships are by far the most important office at the provincial level and 
the way in which negotiations between the national and provincial executives evolves is seen as 
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 determinant of decentralizing policies (Falletti 2000; Jones et al 2000). Further, considering that 
many policies of the central government that require legislation to give them effect involve a 
coalition that is broader than the members of the incumbent party alone, presidents seek to 
captivate the other parties’ governors support. The latter, largely unaffected by incumbent’s 
intra-party rules and the effect of legislative party discipline, are likely to behave in an 
opportunistic manner, trying to extract higher transfer payments from the national government 
than governors from the president’s party would. Partisan disharmony is assessed using a dummy 
variable indicating whether the provincial governor belongs to a party that is different of that of 
the president. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Presidents facing divided government at the provincial level will be more 
likely to increase the level of FONAVI and ATN transfers to the provinces controlled by the 
opposition. 
 
Drawing heavily on evidence from US states, a body of scholarship has concluded that while 
several political and institutional factors affect budgetary outcomes, the absence of simultaneous 
same-party majorities in executive and legislative branches of government60 is a decisive 
influence in fiscal polices (Alt and Lowry 1994; McCubbins 1991). This factor, known as 
divided government, refers to those cases in which the executive is unable to rely on a solid 
contingent in the legislature approving his/her policy proposals. Divided government is a 
widespread political phenomenon that affects a wide range of political systems (Ecuador, 
Mexico, France, Finland, Poland, Denmark and others) and it acquires particular relevance in 
                                                 
60   This characterization is borrowed from Elgie (2001: 2), who provides one of the most 
comprehensive analyses of divided government in comparative perspective. 
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 Argentina, where relatively high levels of party discipline furnish the national executive with 
coercive resources 61 to induce copartisan legislators to behave in line with national fiscal 
objectives (Jones 1997). Divided government is measured at the provincial level, as the 
percentage of deputies who do not belong to the president’s party.62 It should be noted that there 
is significant variation in the legislative structures across Argentine provinces because some 
provinces have bicameral legislatures (e.g. Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos) and others have 
unicameral ones (e.g. La Pampa, San Juan, Neuquén). Adding to this wide gamut of institutional 
designs is the confounding effect of provincial constitutions that regulate the balance of powers 
between houses differently. As a result, we code all provinces as unicameral, just adding up the 
total number of legislators in both houses when the province is bicameral. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 7: Provinces where the governor is representing a regional party will have a 
significant larger proportion of FONAVI and ATN transfers than provinces ruled by other 
parties 
 
While two-party presidentialism has been the hallmark of Argentine national politics throughout 
the last century, provincial parties became meaningful actors at the subnational level. This 
development is crucial for understanding the evolution of intergovernmental transfers given the 
                                                 
61   These resources stem primarily from the fact that the national executive is the most important 
figure in its respective party, having considerable influence over the candidate nomination 
process mainly due to the use of closed-party lists to elect legislators in Argentina. 
62   Previous studies used a dummy variable to classify divided government based on a 50 percent 
majority threshold (Alt and Lowry 1994). This operationalization, however, is suitable for a US-
like bipartisan composition of the legislature. In Argentina, provincial parties are significant 
forces at the subnational legislative level (e.g. Corrientes, Chaco, Jujuy, Neuquén, Salta, San 
Juán, San Luis), thus a stronger multiparty composition is better captured by using percentages 
rather than dichotomous values. 
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 fact that some regions have regional-party dominant systems providing them advantages over 
regions with higher levels of electoral volatility. Previous research has shown that, with few 
exceptions, national politicians have used fiscal transfers to strengthen the allegiance of 
provincial party leaders (Gibson 1996; Remmer and Wibbels 2000). This patronage-driven 
mechanism derives from provincial parties’ fewer opportunities to obtain discretionary resources 
than their mainstream challengers at the regional level. In many respects, it is not too far-fetched 
to argue that long-standing dominance of provincial bosses on regional politics has translated 
into lavish transfers to their respective regions to the detriment of provinces more susceptible to 
electoral manipulation. In a country where governors act as agents of the president (Snow 1971), 
such channeling of financial support to provincial parties-dominated regions seems to be a price 
worth being paid. This variable is measured using a dummy variable indicating whether the 
provincial executive is controlled by a provincial party. 
 
 
Table 4: DETERMINANTS OF FONAVI TRANSFERS: PANEL-CORRECTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
Independent Variables  z   p < .05 
Intercept             -1.04   0.297 
Population    1.10   0.270 
Unemployment              1.08   0.281 
Geographical GDP   2.07   0.039 
House Building            - 1.18   0.237 
Provincial Party Governor  0.70   0.487 
Divided Government   1.69   0.090 
Partisan Disharmony            -0.87   0.386 
FONAVI t-1                 10.31   0.000  
Note: N = 294. The dependent variable is yearly changes in the evolution of FONAVI transfers 
to provinces from 1972 to 2000. R2 = 0.91. Wald Chi2 = 470.66 (prob > chi2 = 0.000). Entries 
are panel-corrected standardized coefficients. 
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 Table 5: DETERMINANTS OF ATN TRANSFERS: PANEL-CORRECTED REGRESSION RESULTS 
Independent Variables  z   p < .05 
Intercept              -0.61   0.542 
Population               3.26   0.001 
Unemployment              2.88   0.004 
Geographical GDP            -0.75   0.452 
Provincial Party Governor             0.53   0.593 
Divided Government   3.05   0.002 
Partisan Disharmony             -2.12   0.034 
Note: N = 215. The dependent variable is yearly changes in the evolution of ATN transfers to 
provinces from 1972 to 2000. R2 = 0.45. Wald Chi2 = 28.41 (prob > chi2 = 0.000). Entries are 
panel-corrected standardized coefficients. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present the coefficients of the equations estimating FONAVI and ATN transfers 
to provinces, respectively. For the FONAVI regression, it was necessary to include the lagged 
value of the dependent variable due to problems of serial correlation.63 Before we proceed to 
discuss the findings for each political factor, it becomes apparent that partisan considerations are 
major shaping influences in the unfolding of these transfers, as they withstand the inclusion of 
decisive socio-demographic and economic variables. If in fact grants are doled out to address 
equity and/or efficiency issues, political factors should not be so conspicuously present. Also, as 
suggested earlier in this chapter, the statistical insignificance of the House Building variable 
denotes a meaningful margin for political manipulation of funds. Beyond providing preliminary 
evidence to advance a political theory of decentralization, these general findings challenge the 
basic postulates of the normative theory of intergovernmental transfers and its emphasis on fiscal 
equity and efficiency as key building blocs (Oates 1972). The major stylized fact emerging from 
this analysis is that economic imperatives are necessary but, by all means, not sufficient 
                                                 
63   This inclusion has inflated the R2 of the equation, which should be then interpreted cautiously.  
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 conditions to account for variation in FONAVI and ATN transfers at the light of the consistent 
and significant effect of the divided government factor. This strong and consistent relationship 
between partisan and legislative variables and the ability of provincial governments to increase 
their share of federal funds corresponds with preliminary evidence offered by Willis et al (1999), 
who argue that party system factors define levels of fiscal decentralization in Latin America.  
 
All in all, the specification of the fiscal federalism variables used here does not capture the 
realities of all intergovernmental transfer programs in Argentina, as it emerges from our 
empirical analysis. In the case of FONAVI, geographical GDP is the only statistically significant 
variable, whose positive sign is indicative of a lack of redistributive concerns in FONAVI 
allocations. However, this relationship is feasible insofar as house building is, all else equal, 
likely to be enhanced in wealthier provinces. Conversely, ATN allocations appear to be far more 
redistributive toward peripheral and underdeveloped provinces of the interior than have been 
other intergovernmental transfers. The positive and statistically significant sign of the 
unemployment variable shows that provinces with higher unemployment rates will obtain higher 
ATN apportionments. As for population, the positive sign indicates that although less populated 
provinces enjoy stronger representation in congress, they do not get a better deal because ATN 
are channeled by the executive.  
 
Turning first to our partisan disharmony variable, Riker and Schaps’ intuition does not provide a 
solid ground to fully explain FONAVI transfers, at the light of its statistical insignificance. While 
in a previous study it is shown that when governorships are ruled by opposition parties, the 
overall amount of (total) federal funds transferred to the provinces increases considerably 
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 (Gordin, forthcoming)64, partisan disharmony appears to be a much weaker predictor of the inter-
provincial distribution of such funds. The overall amount of FONAVI transfers hinges on 
bilateral bargaining between the central government and each province precluding the 
coordination of strategies among governors, regardless of their partisan color. 65 Said bilateral 
bargaining generates a zero-sum game dynamics among governors and bolsters the territorial 
aspects of interest representation and bargaining vis-à-vis partisan interests. Moreover, the 
“catch-all” nature of Argentina’s mainstream parties, the Peronist Party and the UCR, leads to 
intra-party confrontations because these parties embrace quite distinct factions.66 As a result, and 
despite some scholars have noted the “executive” nature of Argentine federalism (Pirez 1986; 
Porto 1996), partisan disharmony between the national and provincial level does not capture the 
diversity of political interactions affecting FONAVI transfers and appears to subside to 
provincial-level politics. On the other hand, a “reverse” effect of the partisan disharmony 
variable is a strong predictor of ATN allocations, namely provinces whose governorships are 
ruled by the national incumbent party are favored. The above-mentioned advantaged status of La 
Rioja exemplifies very clearly this finding. Partisan interests gain preeminence because ATN 
                                                 
64   In this analysis, the dependent variable is the evolution of the main federal intergovernmental 
funds transferred to all provinces, excluding the FTSA.  
65   The Housing Committee in Argentine Congress is the main arena where FONAVI 
appropriations are negotiated. Considering that governors are extremely influential in the 
determination of committee chairmanships (Jones et al. 2002: 666-667), and that the Argentine 
legislators are provincially party-centered (as the locus of nominations is at the provincial level), 
national partisan interests fall short of determining FONAVI outcomes and territorially-based 
party interests prevail. 
66   Borrowing from Eaton (2002: 287), “Whether provincial party leaders support the national 
party leadership is largely a function of factional disputes within the party. Factions typically 
take shape as provincial party leaders cluster around the various governors jockeying for support 
as the party’s next presidential standard bearer. In President Menem’s second term, for example, 
different brands of intra-party opposition to his leadership were organized by Governors Eduardo 
Duhalde of Buenos Aires, Nestor Kirchner of Santa Cruz, and Arturo Lafalla of Mendoza”. 
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 funds are allocated by the highly centralized Ministry of Interior, which is an agency known to 
resort to a “stick and carrots” strategy to sort out intergovernmental conflict.67
 
Substantiating the works of scholars questioning O’Donnell’s thesis of delegative (i.e. executive-
dominated) democracy (Eaton 2002; Jones 2001), we found that legislative politics in Argentina, 
at least with regard to intergovernmental transfers, “matter”. In both tables, the divided 
government variable is statistically significant and carries the expected sign, which indicates that, 
as Garman et al (2001: 210) have found in their study of fiscal decentralization in Latin America, 
“under divided government, legislators will be attentive to checking the powers of the president, 
including her control of resources, and will seek to channel resources to their copartisans at the 
subnational level”. While the significance of this finding for the case of FONAVI was somewhat 
expected, considering that the Housing Congressional Committee is the main decision-making 
arena, its relevance for ATN allocations needs further clarification. First, there is an apparent 
contradiction between the partisan encapsulation at the executive level, where governors who 
belong to the president’s are favored, and the parallel rewarding of provinces represented by 
legislators of the opposition parties. However, the concurrence of these two strategies maximizes 
support-building, and the highly discretionary character of ATN transfers permits presidents and, 
by extension, the Minister of Interior a high degree of strategic flexibility, while still maintaining 
a solid base of support. In this regard, it is noteworthy that during Alfonsín’s presidency (1983-
                                                 
67  The Ministry of Interior is also a decisive actor in federal interventions to provinces. 
Cetrangolo and Jimenez (1997: 30-31) argue that the Ministry of Interior “compensates” 
federally-intervened provinces by increasing their ATN allocations in the years right after 
interventions. Given the intermittent (and mostly variable) episodes of interventions, we cannot 
use this information for statistical analysis. 
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 1989), which is the period when ATN virtually substituted FTSA transfers68, there was some 
deviation from this pattern insofar as both Peronist governors and senators were 
disproportionately rewarded by Alfonsín. While it is beyond the scope of this data analysis, it is 
important to point out that there are different gradations in the divided government phenomenon. 
For instance, there is a significant difference between a situation where the president’s party 
controls only one house or none (Alt and Lowry 1994). In the case of Alfonsín, when divided 
government intensified, following his party defeat at the 1987 mid-term elections, he lost the 
ability to build Peronist support in congress following the increased leverage of this party to 
legislate a return to automatic revenue-sharing procedures.  
 
Regarding the political influence of a governorship controlled by a regionalist party, we found no 
support for the hypothesized effect in Argentina, as this variable is statistically insignificant for 
FONAVI and ATN transfers. One possible explanation for this finding stems from the 
ideological orientation of Argentine provincial parties, mostly clustered at the center-right and 
thus closer to the Peronist Party. In the last 10 years covered in this study, provincial parties have 
massively supported the candidacy of Carlos Menem and his subsequent attempt to cut down 15 
percent in the primary distribution of FTSA to the provinces to finance the proposed 
nationalization of the social security system. An additional cause of this seemingly minor role 
played the provincial parties’ czars stems from their progressive ambitions (Schlesinger 1966), 
insofar as provincial governorships in Argentina are strategic springboards to attain national 
                                                 
68   Throughout these years, the incumbent UCR only held a majority in the lower house, and only 
until 1987, when Peronism assumed the majority of this chamber. Peronists exploited a 
constitutional clause that all revenue-sharing bills must originate in the National Senate and 
blocked the passing of badly needed revenue-sharing law reforms. Alfonsin manipulated this 
legislative vacuum by resorting to ATN transfers to compensate for provincial fiscal shortfalls. 
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 leverage, buttressing their prospects to run in subsequent presidential elections as candidates. In 
this light, governors from provincial parties seek to cast a fiscally-responsible image and 
conceal, to the extent possible their clientelist and opportunistic streak.69
 
4.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1 “And the Last Shall Come First”: The Inter-Provincial 
Distribution of Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
The preceding results for FONAVI and ATN apportionment are consistent with the so-called 
politico-economic “partisan model” of elected officials from competing parties, who safeguard 
their political destiny through public provision. Significant as these first findings are, they are 
only a building bloc to test the typology outlined in Chapter 2. Having revealed that the political 
determination of transfers is consistently high, it is necessary now to examine whether transfer-
dependent provinces are rewarded compared to provinces with higher fiscal capacity. For that 
purpose, we will use cross-section analysis of transfers to provinces in 1995.70 This year 
epitomizes the beginning of a period in which provincial administrations were pushed to 
modernize their public administrations systems, reform the structure of provincial taxes, and, 
more importantly, improve their own-resource mobilization. Accordingly, this is the time when 
the federal government was expected to grapple effectively with the challenges of provincial 
                                                 
69  Personal communication with Juan Carlos Pezoa (former Subsecreatario de Relaciones 
Fiscales con Provincias, Ministerio de Economía, Under Secretary of Provincial Affairs, July 30, 
2001. 
70  An alternative approach to focusing on 1995 is to use cross-section averages for the period 
1990-1995 (Gibson and Calvo 2000, Stein 1998), which is a critical period of fiscal adjustment 
following the introduction of the Convertibility Plan that paved the way for the restoration of 
macroeconomic stability at the national level. However, we believe that although provincial 
fiscal performance has been consistently poor throughout these years, the incentives to 
overspend and/or undertax have been at variance following the introduction of the Fiscal Pacts in 
1992 and 1993. 
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 fiscal adjustment, providing an ideal counterfactual laboratory to map out the extent of 
peripheralization of inter-provincial transfer distributions. 
 
- 1995: An Illustrative Case-Study  
The analysis of the inter-provincial distribution of federal funds in 1995 offers an interesting case 
to examine the extent to which economically disadvantaged provinces can tilt their share of 
transfers at a time when financial imperatives were expected to reduce subnational fiscal 
autonomy. This year amounts to a “critical juncture”71 that was expected to reduce the 
maneuvering margin of poor provinces to retain a lion share of federal transfers, providing a 
useful testing ground of extreme fiscal conditions. More specifically, this year represents a 
crossroad of the beginning of the demise of the Convertibility Plan, the Mexican Crisis in late 
1994, and the lagging effects of the 1992 and 1993 Fiscal Pacts.  
 
The Convertibility Plan: Seen as the only remedy to curb hyperinflation, the 1991 Convertibility 
law forbid the Central Bank from using the money supply to finance the public deficit, and 
money creation was permitted only to the extent that international (i.e. US dollars) reserves were 
increased. While this plan help to increase provincial revenue, expenditures quickly 
accommodated and provincial deficits grew from 0.2 percent of GPD in 1992 to 1.2 percent in 
1995 (World Bank 1996: 2).72 This overall unsustainable level of debt has not swayed provinces’ 
                                                 
71   Collier and Collier (1991: 29-30) define critical juncture “as a period of significant change, 
which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and 
which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies”.  
72    Provinces have historically benefited from agricultural exports income, but their export 
capabilities were severely curbed given the ensuing parity of the Argentine peso to the US dollar 
mandated by the Convertibility Law, which made Argentine exports unreasonably expensive and 
thus uncompetitive. 
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 attempts to resort to financing operations such as borrowing from their official banks73 and 
issuing “coupons” in lieu of wage payments.  
 
The “Tequila” Effect: The above-mentioned weaknesses of the new monetary regime were 
underscored after the Mexican crisis in late 1994. Following the collapse of the Mexican 
currency, Argentina’s monetary base shrank sharply (almost a 20 percent, a reduction 
comparable to that experienced by the United States in the 1929 crisis). This resulted in 
numerous deposit losses that threatened to bankrupt the provincial banks. To avoid massive 
defaults, many provincial banks, mostly from peripheral provinces, were privatized, amounting 
to a (re) centralization of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Eaton and Dickovick 2004: 97).74   
 
The 1992 and 1993 Fiscal Pacts: Touted as potential watersheds in the reform of fiscal 
federalism in Argentina, the Pactos Fiscales were negotiated bilaterally with provincial 
governors to reduce provincial revenue shares and the transfer of key expenditures 
responsibilities (education, health, and housing) without the corresponding revenue resources. In 
a nutshell, President Menem sought to replace the automatic (i.e. decentralizing) distribution 
criteria for FTSA funds legislated in 1987 with selectively induced benefits to compliant 
                                                 
73   The Argentine Constitution of 1853 endows provinces with the right to borrow in 
international financial markets and establish their own official banks. 
74   The fact that privatization of provincial central banks centralizes further the powers of the 
monetary authority (controlled by the federal government) raises interesting paradoxes about 
fiscal decentralization policies. This relationship is somewhat ironic insofar as decentralized 
choice of central banks seeks to insulate them from direct participation by the citizenry, while, in 
most cases, decentralized choice is praised because it rather enhances citizen participation. Also, 
privatization is, intuitively and coarsely speaking, thought to lead to deregulation and thus seen 
as a decentralizing measure. However, the above-mentioned seemingly controversial connection 
is consistent with Karl Polany’s claim that deregulation of markets leads to centralization of 
political authority and oversight (Sbragia 2000). 
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 governors. In 1992, they negotiated to reroute 15 percent of the revenues slated to be transferred 
to provincial governments toward the national social security system, which was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. To offset this concession, provinces obtained transfers with a minimum amount 
guaranteed. Defiant provinces (e.g. Entre Ríos, Chaco, Jujuy) were selectively punished with no 
payments, until they gave in. Echoing the political-ridden character of this pact, Menem signed a 
second fiscal pact in 1993 with governors aimed at deregulating and reducing/eliminating 
provincial taxes that affect enterprise and employment costs.  This move was a “token of 
appreciation” to the business sector, to limit the autonomy of the governors to set their own tax 
bases and fine-tune the provincial tax systems to mirror the neoliberal reforms Menem had 
implemented at the national level.75 Facing seven governors refusing to sign, selective debt relief 
and, mostly, federal infrastructure investments were used by the national government to marshal 
subnational support. In summary, beyond the nature of the issues addressed in each fiscal pact, a 
recurrent thread in Menem’s moves has been to weaken coordination among provinces and 
deepen federal controls over subnational revenue to preclude provincial expansion of public 
spending and thus strengthening their own patronage networks. 
 
Based on this sketch of the fiscal scene in 1995, and its concomitant constraints on inter-
provincial capacity to join ranks and oppose the federal executive’s moves, what kind of 
provinces succeeded in attracting a larger share of federal transfers? In order to respond this 
question, we investigate the distribution of FEDEI transfers to provinces in said year. As argued 
previously, a cross-section model is more appropriate to zoom in on the context set out above. 
For this analysis, we will add a variable to measure transfer-dependency that taps into the Index 
                                                 
75   Personal communication with Prof. Alberto Porto, Universidad de La Plata, July 25, 2001. 
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 of Fiscal Politicization used in Chapter 2 but measured at the subnational level instead. For this 
purpose, we will use an indicator of provincial financial capacity, which is the 
revenue/expenditure flexibility variable and operationalized as the provincially-generated 
revenue as a percentage of total revenue.76 This, in turn, will be our approach to uncover the 
extent of peripheralization in the distribution of transfers and our main independent variable. 
Based on our previous time-series findings and qualitative evidence presented above, we expect 
this factor to be negatively associated with federal transfers, which is to say, poorer provinces 
will receive a higher share of funds. Further, the equation to estimate this model will include all 
the statistically-significant variables in the pooled time-series analysis, which will function as 
control variables.77
Thus we estimate the following model: 
FEDEI = B0 + b1 Population + b2 Unemployment + b3 Revenue/Expenditure Flexibility 
              + b4 Divided Government + b5 Partisan Disharmony + e 
Table 6: THE DETERMINANTS OF FEDEI TRANSFERS: RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS 
Independent Variables          Coefficient     t 
Intercept                1.367     6.111 
Population      .192     .787 
Unemployment               -.060   -.187 
Revenue/Expenditure Flexibility             -.561**            -1.808 
Divided Government               -.272              -.781 
Partisan Disharmony      .046    .095 
** Significant at the 0.08 level (2-tailed test) 
Note: N = 24. The dependent variable is the evolution of FEDEI transfers to provinces in 1995. 
R2 = 0.29. Entries are standardized coefficients. 
                                                 
76   The source of data used for this variable is the 1996 World Bank’s Argentina Provincial 
Finances Study. 
77   We exclude geographical GDP because it is strongly correlated (about 60 percent and 
statistically significant) with the revenue/expenditure factor and thus induces to multicollinearity. 
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The results are reported in Table 3. The support in favor of the peripheralization is strong and the 
coefficient for the revenue/expenditure flexibility variable is large and carries the expected sign. 
Its level of statistical significance is somewhat below the ideal level, but is nonetheless 
acceptable given its closeness to the .05 level and because it emerges as the only significant 
relevant factor.78 This trend is further illustrated in Chart 1, where it becomes apparent that the 
actual inter-provincial distribution fits the regression line. However, and despite the pronounced 
downward slop of the actual inter-provincial distribution, we can see that there is a sudden 
increase in FEDEI transfers contrary to the expected direction. To tease out what really account 
for this inconsistency and identify what province/s are included, Chart 2 presents a scatter plot 
where it is clear that there is one outlier, the province of Salta. This is an interesting case, insofar 
as Salta’s fiscal situation is stable and it ranks among the best performers in debt service (World 
Bank 1996). But, on the other hand, Salta is a relatively socially-underdeveloped province79 and 
its territory, and hence its energy needs, is considerably larger than other provinces with similar 
developmental traits. In political terms, it is noteworthy that while the Peronist Party has 
consistently controlled Salta’s governorship for decades, the Partido Renovador de Salta (Salta’s 
Innovation Party), a center-right provincial party known as a “hard-to-buy” party, won the 
governorship elections in 1991 and controlled the province until the end of 1995. It is possible, 
                                                 
78   To examine whether this relatively low significance level is a function of the N of this sample 
(i.e. 24 provinces), we simulated an increase in N size by using the “weight cases” function in 
SPSS. This N increase is weighted by the ratio between the number of provinces in Argentina 
and the number of states in the United States. The latter case is a comparable federation, which, 
given its relatively high number of subnational units, provides a realistic yardstick to 
“artificially” expand the number of observations. It turns out that that the revenue/expenditure 
flexibility variable maintains the largest coefficient in the sample, the appropriate sign, and its 
significance level comes near to p < .01. 
79   Salta’s poverty index (i.e. percentage of households with Unsatisfied Basic Needs) for 1995 is 
37.1 percent well above the national average of 19.9 percent for that year (INDEC 1997). 
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 then, that some combination of socio-demographic and political factors has skewed FEDEI 
transfers to Salta beyond fiscal consideration, but this still remains a question to be investigated 
in future studies. 
Figure 2: CURVE FIT 
FEDEI
rev/exp flex
100806040200
6000000
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
Observed
Linear
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 Figure 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDEI ALLOCATIONS AND PROVINCIAL TRANSFER 
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These preliminary findings are consistent with historical records about the secondary distribution 
of intergovernmental transfers. Using data from 1935 to 1994, Rezk (1998: 225, 231) shows that 
ever since revenue-sharing was implemented for the first time in 1935 a gradual trend in favor of 
poorer provinces is conspicuous. While high-revenue provinces like Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, and 
Córdoba experienced a decrease of 24 percent, low-revenue provinces were benefited with an 
increase of 21 percent. Likewise, Sawers (1996: 245) argues that “in 1900, when federal 
assistance was minimal, the most advanced provinces (Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fé, and 
Mendoza) spent five times per capita what the most backward provinces spent (La Rioja, 
Catamarca, Corrientes, Jujuy, Misiones, Chaco, Santiago, and Formosa). By 1960, they were 
spending roughly the same amount per capita. By the mid-1980s, the poorest provinces were 
spending almost twice what the most prosperous provinces spent on each citizen”.  The political 
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 correlate of this redirecting of economic resources toward the development of backward 
provinces is the historical alliance among elites from poor provinces and a strong and 
autonomous central government to prevent one province’s (i.e. Buenos Aires) dominating the 
others in Argentina. This intersection of interests was formalized through the creation of 
institutions such as the Senate and the Electoral College that elected the president (Botana 1996: 
243).  More crucially, provincial governments moved to the institutional center stage, playing an 
important role in deciding who gets sent to Congress. National senators are chosen by provincial 
legislatures, not by popular vote.80 Thus, control over provincial governments means control 
over the national senate and veto power over fiscal decentralization legislation.  
This brief narrative highlights that while legislative politics, and more specifically divided 
government, is directly linked to the geography of fiscal transfers, territorial interests have 
historically played a decisive role in the crafting of political institutions in Argentina. This 
suggests that both layers of analysis appear to be mutually endogenously determined. 
Disappointing as this afterthought may be to a pursuit of causal analysis, it nonetheless 
foreshadows some inherent hurdles in any conceptualization of the politics of decentralization. 
Borrowing from Samuel Beer’s Presidential Address to the American Political Science 
Association in 1977, “more important than any shifts of power or function between levels of 
government has been the emergence of new arenas of mutual influence among levels of 
government” (Beer 1978: 9).  
 
 
 
                                                 
80   Following the 1994 Constitutional reform, Senators are currently elected by popular vote. 
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 Summary 
What remains of our explanatory typology of fiscal decentralization? The answer must be that 
the political determination of transfers appears to be associated to the extent of peripheralization 
of the inter-provincial distribution of funds. In this vein, the Argentine case looms close to what 
we characterized as cooptative decentralization. This type of decentralization, however, goes 
well beyond the realm of private patron-client relationships and it thrives in the public sphere, 
more specifically in legislative institutions where decisions about revenue-sharing bills and 
policies are made.  However, what is the trigger mechanism? In our analysis, it is shown that 
partisan interests lurked underneath the ability of economically disadvantaged yet politically 
powerful provinces to attract a lion share of federal transfers beyond economic and social 
welfare considerations. Accordingly, we argue that a large part of the answer lies in territorial 
over-representation in the national legislature, particularly in the senate. Part of the argument has 
already been made – coalition-building goals drove presidents to reach out legislators of the 
opposition by means of allocating larger shares of federal transfers to the provinces the latter 
belong to. Subsequently, in Chapter 5, we will return to this topic, showing that the Argentine 
Senate ranks as one of the world’s most malapportioned chambers. Second, bilateral bargaining 
between the president and governors on a “first-come, first-serve” basis creates a structural 
institutional imbalance and constitutes a constant source of inter-provincial conflict. Then, we 
will discuss how these institutional traits link the two explanatory axes of our fiscal 
decentralization typology.  
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 5 Chapter 5:  The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain: Time-
series and Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
The political and administrative map of Spain is now radically different from what it was less 
than thirty years ago. The authoritarian and centralized machinery of the Franco regime was 
replaced by a federal structure in which the powers of the state are shared with seventeen newly 
created autonomous communities (henceforth, AC), each endowed with its own president (i.e. 
governor), parliament and high court of justice.81 A characteristic of the devolutionary process 
since 1978 has been the granting to each region its own degree of autonomy adapted to its 
particular situation and resulting from political compromises between the national government 
and the regional leadership (Watts 1999: 38). Whereas the political dimension of this process has 
no generated significant asymmetries, this “multispeed” regional dynamics manifests itself in the 
creation of a hybrid intergovernmental fiscal system.  One group of regional governments, 
including Navarra and the Basque Country82, Catalonia, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalusia, 
Galicia, and the Canary Islands (the so-called Article 151 ACs) has a wide range of fiscal 
competencies, comprising regional control of education and health.  A second group, which 
includes all other ACs, (under Article 143 of the Constitution) has a more restricted range of 
competences but it preserved the constitutional right to assume further responsibilities. This 
                                                 
81   Paradoxically, Spain is not a federation in name. Among the reasons accounting for the 
reluctance to include the notion of federalism explicitly in the drafting of the post-Franco 1978 
Constitution is the apprehension of the Unión de Centro Democrático, (UCD) Union of the 
Democratic Center - namely the party that steered the democratic transition – to encourage 
radical nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Federalism is a highly controversial 
concept in the Spanish public discourse because it brings to mind some of the conflicts that 
triggered the Civil War in the 1930s. 
82   Known as Fuero (i.e. forum) ACs, the Basque Country and Navarra were set apart from all 
other regions in that they could collect most taxes in exchange for payment of an annual 
percentage (the cupo) to the national government. This system of finance allows to restore some 
historical charters of the two ACs. 
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 open-endedness allowed all ACs to expand their policymaking authority and resources over time. 
For instance, the share of ACs of total national spending increased from 0.1 in 1979 to 23.9 
percent in 1997, while in the same period of time the central government moved down from 88 
to 63.8 percent (Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas Autonómicas 1999).83 
Likewise, as a result of “autonomous pacts” between the two major political parties, the Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Partido Popular, 
Popular Party (PP), in the 1990’s additional powers have been transferred to all ACs so that they 
are almost on a par with the “fast-track” group. 
 
However, the level of revenue decentralization is comparable to that of Argentina, since the 
central government still collects about 80 percent of tax revenue (Bosch Roca 1992: 108). With 
the exceptions of Navarra and the Basque Country, ACs are primarily financed by tax-sharing 
grants. The dependence of the ACs on intergovernmental transfers is illustrated by the fact that 
on the 1990s these transfers represented, on average, about 72 percent of the total revenue of the 
ACs (Ministerio de Hacienda 2003).  
The largest subvention is the Porcentaje de Participación en Impuestos no Cedidos), or General 
Revenue Sharing (PPI)84, which is unconditional and aimed at guaranteeing the financing of 
public services with a volume of transfers to cover the difference between the coste efectivo 
(actual cost) and the revenues actually obtained from the ceded taxes. Unlike the Argentine 
FTSA, this transfer is ruled by varying coefficients that prioritize population and territorial size, 
                                                 
83   This level of expenditure decentralization is much higher than that we can find in federal 
countries with similar economic and political set-up like Belgium (about 12 percent), matching 
Austria, and slightly bellow Germany and the United States (Watts 1999: 47). 
84   Although the conditional grant for the financing of health services is almost equally large, we 
exclude it from this analysis because it is only doled out to the fast-track ACs. 
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 but it shares with the former a significantly lower potential of political manipulation than other 
grants (Monasterio Escudero and Suarez Pandielo 1998). Among the conditional grants the 
Fondo de Compensación Interritorial, Interterritorial Compensation Fund (FCI) looms large as 
the most important redistributive fund to reduce disparities among regions through mainly 
investment projects. While at the time of its creation this fund was designed to support public 
investment in all regions, in 1990 it was revised to be a purely redistributive grant and several 
ACs were excluded from it (García-Mila and McGuire 2001). When Spain joined the European 
Community in 1986, the regions also benefited from the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, 
European Fund for Regional Development (FEDER) to attenuate inter-territorial wealth gaps. 
 
Despite the prevailing wisdom that subnational governments in Spain are capable to bypass 
Madrid and have an important bearing on Brussels’ decision on structural funds (Allen 1996, 
Dudek 2001), Börzel (2002: 106) convincingly shows that the central government has 
traditionally been reluctant to involve the regions in the implementation of EU policies. Further, 
the central state has limited the effect of Europeanization on intergovernmental fiscal relations 
by ensuring that the Spanish funding programs outdo the European funds in their magnitude. For 
instance, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which is the largest EU funding 
program after agricultural assistance, is only a fraction of the FCI. From 1982 to 1993, whereas 
the ERDF amounted to a 24 percent of the total structural (national and EU), the FCI constituted 
a 59 percent of the total (García-Milá and McGuire 2001: 284).  This uneven distribution 
resulted in a redistribution of power between the central and autonomic governments to the 
detriment of the latter. However, in mapping the secondary distribution, we will see how that 
some ACs succeeded to resist centralizing moves of the center more than others. 
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5.1 The Empirical Analysis 
This chapter zooms in on the evolution of the other two conditional (i.e. earmarked) transfer 
programs, that alike the case-studies used to examine the Argentina case, are based on 
discretionary determination. The first is Subvenciones Gestionadas, Subsidies (SG), which is 
funding provided by the central government for various policy goals mainly aimed at financing 
welfare schemes by the regional Ministries of Labor and Social Security. On average, this sector, 
combined with Education and Science, captures nearly 99 percent of the total amount of 
subsidies, enhancing its fiscal and political significance (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
1995: 84-85). In practical terms, this type of assistance is intended to support deficit-ridden 
regional administrations, but in principle is open to all ACs. The second, known as Convenios de 
Inversión, Joint Investment Agreements (CI), is mainly used to increase the stock of capital 
necessary for the provision of public services with spillover effects85, but also to compensate for 
deficiencies in certain services transferred to the regions. While smaller than the above-
mentioned transfer programs, the latter two have experienced an increase of almost a 30 percent 
during the 1990s (Banco de España 1999). 
 
5.1.1 Benevolent Central Planners or Strategic Politicians?: The 
Determination of Federal Transfers, Spanish Style 
 
The general thrust of this part is to estimate the impact of political factors at the subnational level 
by regressing the same sets of efficiency/equity and electoral/institutional variables we used to 
analyze the Argentine case on SG and CI transfers. We will analyze the extent to which federal 
transfers are politically determined, namely the Y axis of the typology laid out in chapter 2. To 
                                                 
85   For instance, these include environment, housing, agriculture, public safety, and tourism. 
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 avoid repetition, the same caveats and rationalization for methodological issues set forth 
previously for the Argentine case apply here. Likewise, the same arguments advanced to 
substantiate the hypotheses apply, however we will contextualize them with evidence and data 
from Spain. Particularly, there are important institutional differences in the functioning of the 
legislatures of these countries, such as the weak role of the Spanish Senate that is more often 
regarded as an “institutional courtesy” than a body where subnational representatives have a 
meaningful say in national policymaking (Colomer 2002: 199; Roller 2002).86 Further, it is 
important to point out that decentralization of public powers occurred only after the 1978 
Spanish Constitution was put in effect. In turn, the creation of the seventeen ACs took five years 
to materialize, as the last Autonomy Statutes were passed in 1983. As a result, longitudinal data 
to examine the politics of fiscal decentralization in Spain are more limited in the amount of years 
that can be used in time-series analysis. That said, pooling these data allows us to overcome that 
limitation so that statistical analysis can still be accomplished. The unit of analysis is an AC in a 
given year. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The approach to identify our measure of fiscal decentralization will be the yearly changes in the 
evolution of SG and CI transfers from 1986 to 1998, which are the only years available for 
consistent and systematic analysis. Again, these two transfers programs are chosen because they 
are the largest pieces of sharable resources available in Spain, in which discretionary criteria 
plays a significant role. To control for the impact of inflation, we have converted all years to 
1992 Pesetas. As mentioned earlier with regard to Argentina, inflation, albeit much more 
                                                 
86   We will elaborate further on this point and provide the empirical details subsequently. 
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 moderate in Spain, affects levels of apportionment to a large extent. However, our explanatory 
models do not focus on monetary effects on fiscal decentralization and thus inflation per se is not 
of interest. Unlike the case of FONAVI in Argentina, it is not possible to gather data on policy 
performance (i.e. housing building) to examine whether transfers were used for earmarked 
purposes or not given that these grants cut across many activity sectors. It remains for future 
study and further data collection efforts to tease out more precisely these details. Appendix 2 
provides a list of data sources used to compile all variables. 
 
Independent Variables 
While there is a relatively significant concentration of the national population in only a few ACs, 
Spain does not have a significantly skewed inter-regional population distribution. 87 Further, 
regions enjoying high levels of economic development do not belong to a single population 
category, as the largest population shares are those of Andalusia and Catalonia, the former the 
poorest AC and the latter very rich. Still, population-related issues have been controversial. For 
instance, when the financing arrangements for 1987-1991 were debated, it was proposed that 
subsidies for education would be based on population distributions that would exclude 
individuals older than 22 years. This factor favored the rapidly demographically-growing 
Andalusia but it was prejudicial to Catalonia. Given that the latter was a necessary coalition 
partner for the then ruling PSOE, whereas the former was a “safe constituency” and that 
Catalonia plays a strategic role in Spain’s economy accounting for about the 16 percent of the 
national GDP, the central government decided to adopt a formulae that includes the total 
                                                 
87   While the inter-regional distribution of population in Argentina is very unbalanced, with only 
the provinces of Buenos Aires and Córdoba accounting for almost 40 percent of the national 
population, Spain’s inter-regional disparities in population density do not deviate from those in 
EU countries of comparable size (Castells 2001). 
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 population. Thus, population has been high in the discussions about fiscal decentralization in 
Spain. We will also hypothesize in this case study a positive relationship between population 
shares and the amount of SG and CI transfers to ACs. This variable is measured using population 
figures based on available census data. 
 
Since the 1970s the Spanish economy has probed unable to create employment at a fast rate 
enough to bring more than temporary reductions in the unemployment rate. In turn, Spain 
experienced an increase in unemployment levels from 2.5 percent in 1973 to 22.7 percent in 
1993 (Hamann 1997: 120). The PSOE’s labor market policies not only attracted opprobrium 
from the unions but they also increased conflict among ACs. García-Mila and McGuire (2001) 
argue that the central government resorted to development funds such as the FCI to tone down 
unemployment tensions. However, they found that transfers did not improve but rather 
deteriorated job creation in recipient ACs. This datum notwithstanding, and changing the 
direction of causality, it is also important to examine the extent to which counter-cyclical 
pressures are play in Spain in the determination of federal transfers. Therefore, we will 
conjecture that ACs with higher unemployment rates will attract higher transfers of SG and CI. 
Unemployment is measures as the AC unemployment rate in percentages. 
 
As hypothesized in the Argentine case, geographical GDP may affect the allocation of 
intergovernmental transfers. There are important differences in terms of GDP across ACs, 
largely reflecting the high concentration of economic activity in two ACs, Catalonia and Madrid, 
which jointly represent more than 35 percent of the total GDP produced in Spain. That said, 
Castells (2001: 191) claims that “comparison with other European countries shows that Spain is 
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 not a country with strong regional imbalances; on the contrary, it has smaller imbalance indexes 
than most of the other large European countries”. In turn, we expect that geographical GDP will 
be negatively correlated in the case of SG because of its considerable welfare module, but not for 
CI, where the public infrastructure component is more prominent. Geographical GDP is 
measured as the per capita AC GDP converted into Pesetas, 1992. 
 
Turning to the political variables, partisan disharmony between the executive of the central and 
subnational governments stands out as a potentially important factor to explain 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Spain. Pacts among elites were commonplace in Spanish 
transition to democracy (Gunther and Higley 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991), facilitating a 
gradual and stable democratization but, more decisively from the standpoint of this section, 
bolstering decision making from “above”. This attempt to accommodate intergovernmental 
relations is a perennial one among federation and it essentially consists of relations between 
elected and appointed first-rank officials of the two levels of government.88 Table 1, however, 
shows that throughout the last two decades, the party elected to government in most of the ACs 
has been the same party elected to national government. More precisely, for the period 1983-
1999, on average, only 38 percent of the seventeen AC presidents belonged to the opposition 
party. This suggests that Spanish Prime Ministers could benefit from ample majorities in high-
level meeting forums such as the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades 
Autónomas, (CPFF) Council for Fiscal and Financial Planning, where negotiations on SG and CI 
allocations take place. As a result, we do not anticipate any significant effect of the partisan 
disharmony on the distribution of these funds. 
                                                 
88   Students of federalism, mainly from Canada, have couched this dynamics as the keystone 
component of “executive federalism” (Smiley 1980; Wiltshire 1980). 
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Table 7: Parties in Central and AC Governments 1983-1999 
                 1983-87     1987-91     1991-96     1996-99     
Party in central government           PSOE        PSOE         PSOE         PP 
(CG) 
 
AC governments of the same           
party as that in CG   12        9              9                 10 
 
AC governments of the main 
opposition party (OP)     3         4   4          3 
 
Percentage of AC presidents of the OP whose party is not in central government 
     25        47             47         33        
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Grau I Creus (2000).          
 
 
While the PSOE held a majority of seats in the national parliament from 1982 to 1993, allowing 
the then Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales to govern freely, in 1989 it lost a recount challenge to 
Izquierda Unida, IU, United Left (formerly the Spanish Communist Party), losing half of its 
seats and thus facing a minority government until 1996. Additionally, considering the fact that, 
following the transition to democracy, no single party enjoyed an absolute majority of seats in 
the parliament, legislative party power has been diffused and open to bargain. Borrowing from 
Peters (1997: 69), “this need to bargain and form a coalition means that, in essence, the coalition 
is a form of divided government”. Thus, “minority governments are the unambiguous 
parliamentary equivalent of divided governments in presidential regimes” (Elgie 2001: 6). As a 
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 result, and mirroring what we hypothesized in the Argentine context, the weaker the central 
government’s party position in parliament, the more pressed it is to include a broader group of 
parties. This need to reach out political opponents is boosted by staggered regional elections in 
the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia, where opposition parties, mainly 
regionally-based, have greater opportunities to introduce new issues onto the political agenda. 
And because the party controlling the majority of seats in the regional legislature appoints the 
AC president, the prime minister must pay serious heed to these subnational elections. Hence, we 
expect a positive relationship between divided government and transfers allocation. Divided 
government is measured at the subnational level, as the percentage of deputies who do not 
belong to the Prime Minister’s party. Unlike Argentina, all ACs have unicameral legislatures, 
facilitating the codification of data.   
 
Considering that the transition to democracy in Spain is inseparably linked to territorial 
decentralization, regionalist parties89 benefited from a significant opportunity structure to attract 
an increasing amount of attention (Pallares, Montero, and Llera 1997).  In turn, regionalist 
parties have had an important impact on political developments in Spain, not just at the 
autonomy level, but also at the center. In a party system subject to a high level of electoral 
volatility90, these parties have attained hegemonic status in some ACs (Convergència i Unió, 
                                                 
89   Some scholars claim that regionalist parties in Spain should be classified as non state- wide 
parties wide because these parties circumscribe their activities over a territory smaller than the 
national territory (Pallarés and Keating 2003). Others prefer the most general notion of 
nationalist (Hernandez Bravo 1989). Elsewhere, I argue that these parties should be identified as 
ethnoregionalist because their demands for regional-level policy making authority stem from, 
and are articulated through, ethnic and identity factors (Gordin 2001) 
90   Flying in the face of the highly influential freezing (i.e. stabilization) thesis about electoral 
realignments in Western Europe espoused by Stein Rokkan, the ruling UCD “suffered perhaps 
the most important electoral defeat ever experienced by a political force in Western Europe; 
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 CiU, in Catalonia, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV, in the Basque Country) and decisively 
important in others (Coalición Canaria, CC, in the Canary Islands, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, 
BNG, in Galicia). Further, regionalist parties profit from their strategic intermediate ideological 
position in the left-right continuum; in fact, mainstream parties prefer to negotiate support for 
national policy outcomes (i.e. budgets) with regionalist parties more than with other national 
parties, because regionalist party leaders are willing to support national policies with minimal 
amendment in exchange for transfers of policy-making authority to the AC governments (Heller 
2002). This king-maker role endows regionalist parties with considerable opportunities to tilt the 
allocation of federal transfers to their jurisdictions, so we will assume a positive relationship 
between regionalist party control of an AC and the corresponding share of SG and CI transfers.91 
This variable is measured using a dummy variable indicating whether the AC executive is 
controlled by a regionalist party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
indeed, its vote share decreased from 35 to 7% and its representation in Congress went from 168 
seats to a mere dozen” (Gunther, Sani and Shabad  in Montabes 1994: 15). Hopkin (1999) 
provides a very vivid account of the meteoric rise and fall of the UCD in the 1980s. 
91   An additional effect of the territorialization of politics in Spain after the death of Franco has 
been that the strong presence of regionalist parties has blocked the emergence of other 
contenders in the party system. For instance, green parties and right-wing neopopulist parties, 
increasingly popular in other West European nations, are insignificant players in the Spanish 
party system. 
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 Table 8: DETERMINANTS OF SUBVENCIONES GESTIONADAS: PANEL-CORRECTED REGRESSION 
RESULTS 
Independent Variables   z   p<.05 
Intercept              1.98    0.048 
Population              2.62    0.009 
Unemployment             2.51               0.012 
Geographical GDP             7.76    0.000 
Regionalist Party President            2.73    0.006 
Divided Government           -3.21    0.001 
Partisan Disharmony           -0.90    0.366 
Note: N = 167. The dependent variable is yearly changes in the evolution of Subvenciones 
Gestionadas transfers to ACs from 1986-1998. R2 = 0.64. Wald Chi2 = 115.27 (prob > chi2 = 
0.000). Entries are panel-corrected standardized coefficients. 
 
 
 
Table 9: DETERMINANTS OF CONVENIOS DE INVERSION: PANEL-CORRECTED REGRESSION 
RESULTS 
Independent Variables   z   p<.05 
Intercept               2.08    0.037 
Population               8.12    0.000 
Unemployment            -0.41    0.680 
Geographical GDP            -0.75    0.455 
Regionalist Party President             1.67    0.095 
Divided Government            -1.15               0.251 
Partisan Disharmony            -0.87    0.384   
Note: N = 200. The dependent variable is yearly changes in the evolution of Convenios de 
Inversión transfers to ACs from 1986-1998. R2 = 0.30. Wald Chi2 = 89.06 (prob > chi2 = 0.000). 
Entries are panel-corrected standardized coefficients 
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 display the results for the SG and CI models. It seems that in most respects, both 
models perform reasonably well. It appears, however, that political variables have less to offer in 
understanding intergovernmental fiscal relations in Spain than in Argentina. Except for the 
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 regionalist party president variable, partisan-institutional parameters do a poor job in predicting 
transfer allocations because partisan disharmony is not statistically significant in both models 
and divided government is only significant in the SG model but carrying the opposite sign. At 
first glance, these findings suggest that, other things equal, the distribution of selective incentives 
to local bosses in Spain is more politically expedient than building legislative support. Albeit 
contradicting the hypothesized effect, the negative sign of the divided government factor should 
be interpreted at the light of certain legislative and electoral dynamics that affect the 
distributional strategies of the main national parties differently. While the PSOE’s parliamentary 
party turnover has been relatively normal, the rate of PP turnover has been higher because many 
of its MPs had gone to take part in regional bureaucracies.92 Furthermore, partisan control of 
both legislative houses by the PSOE from 1982 to1993 has not been related to decentralizing 
trends. Boix (1998) study of public investment in the ACs made by the PSOE convincingly 
shows that state spending was territorially biased toward Andalusia and Extremadura, which 
were the AC where the PSOE had its strongest electoral support.93 Put differently, coalition 
interests subsided to partisan interests, diminishing the explanatory power of the divided 
government variable.  
 
Conversely, according to our data, regionalist party presidencies are consistently successful in 
luring federal transfers to their ACs. If, as Ames (2001: 24) claims, “without a question, political 
support is exchanged for government jobs and public works in every society”, regionalist parties 
                                                 
92   Personal communication with a Diputado PP (Comunidad Valenciana,  February 10, 2002. 
93   In this regard, Hopkin (2001: 128) argues that ”the most emblematic example of this was the 
establishment of Spain’s first high-speed rail link (the AVE) between Madrid and the Socialist 
bastion Sevilla (Andalusia’s most populated province and capital, note in parenthesis is not in 
original), rather than the more obvious link between the capital and Barcelona”. 
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 can take additional advantage of increasing transfers to their respective ACs, because, in regional 
voters’ mind, pork-barreling is inherently intertwined with regionally defined appeals to increase 
spending powers.94 Questions of public spending and services, and more generally policy 
outputs, take on a regional face and become the “flesh and blood” of center-regional conflicts. It 
remains to be seen, however, what factors make these parties more successful in some ACs than 
others, which is an issue we will address in the next section of this chapter. 
 
We turn now to the estimation of the efficiency/equity variables. In the SG model, these factors 
provide an adequate empirical explanation of the determination of transfers. Thus, the ostensible 
welfare goals of this transfer program are reflected in its elasticity in respect to demographic and 
unemployment considerations. However, we find no support for the hypothesized effect of 
geographical GDP, which has a positive sign, namely, that richer ACs attract higher shares of 
transfers. This finding is questionable because in a redistributive-oriented program availability of 
resources should undercut the levels of transfers relative to more economically-constrained 
scenarios. Table 3 shows, on the other hand, that CI transfers are less vulnerable to equalization 
imperatives. Both macroeconomic and counter-cyclical factors fall short of accounting for 
variations in this grant program. Considering that these agreements consist mostly of public 
works projects, “distributive” politics (Lowi 1964) calculations lessen the impact of fiscal 
expediency calculations, so these preliminary findings should come as no surprise. More 
conclusively, population looms large as the most important socio-demographic variable in both 
                                                 
94  Van Houten (2000) explored this possibility more systematically across Western Europe and 
he found that regionalist leaders try to claim credit for their support for fiscal autonomy. When 
these leaders compete against national parties, his argument goes, incentives for mobilizing 
broad support are large, and demanding revenue powers is unwieldy. On the other hand, if they 
compete against other regional parties, demanding taxing powers amounts to a “credibility 
ribbon” to represent regional interests. 
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 transfer programs and it is positively signed. What is more, population is the most significant and 
strong factor in the equation estimating CI allocations. In other words, discretionary federal 
transfers in Spain favor larger, i.e. more densely populated, ACs. 
 
 
5.1.1.1 The Limits to Redistribution: The Inter-AC Distribution of 
Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain 
 
Now that the factors thrusting the political determination of discretionary intergovernmental 
transfers have been described, it is time to examine whether transfer-dependency in Spain leads 
also to larger grants. We have argued that both theoretically and empirically that the best way to 
assess the geographical underpinnings of these transfers is with a static, cross-section model. 
Accordingly, we will focus on the inter-AC distribution of the above-analyzed programs in 1994. 
This year, of course, is not chosen randomly and its selection is based on the convergence of 
major policy changes and significant shifts in the relationship between the central and the 
subnational governments. Chief among these changes are the landslide defeat of the PSOE in the 
general 1993 elections and its resulting (and unexpected) effect in the development of Spanish 
fiscal federalism. That is, the inclusion of the Catalan CiU in the PSOE-led minority government 
increasingly fragmented the national state’s control over fiscal policy, allowing all other ACs to 
increase the share of autonomously collected resources, thus setting the ground for the inchoate 
policy of corresponsabilidad fiscal (autonomic fiscal accountability). 
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 -“Café para todos” (coffee for everybody): The 1993 Elections, Fiscal Authority Transfer 
and its Demonstration Effects 
 
The results of the general elections in 1993 ushered in a radical change in the ruling coalition 
makeup. Abruptly weakened and 17 seats short of a majority, the PSOE had to choose between 
including the former Communists or the Catalan nationalists. Albeit reluctant to unleash a 
dramatic federalization in Spain, the PSOE opted for the latter group because the IU opposed 
European integration and the liberalization of labor markets, two central pillars of the PSOE’s 
political agenda (Maravall 1999: 154-97). This opened a “window of opportunity” for the CiU, 
which eager to emulate the Basque and Navarese fuero system, succeeded in persuading the 
central government to cede 15 percent of the general income taxes to the Catalan government. 
Even with some ACs opposing the implementation of this reform in their jurisdiction95, this 
formula was extended to all ACs. In many respects, this development shows that while “front-
runners” like the Basque Country and Catalonia sought to expand their own autonomy, and 
despite that regional bosses in poorer regions were interested in preserving the political benefits 
of “fiscal illusion”, the moves of the “front-runners” dialectically interacted with an “evening 
out” of competences across all autonomic administrations and thus strengthened the principle of 
fiscal accountability in Spain. Colomer (1999: 47) argues that “the creation of 17 autonomous 
communities has had the unintended consequence of promoting strong rivalry among them, even 
when they are governed by members of the same party.  Most autonomous governments have 
ceaselessly requested increasing financial transfers and legal powers from the central 
                                                 
95   For instance, Galicia and other poorer regions were aware that this reform would benefit 
wealthier regions, given their greater tax-generating capacity. Put coarsely, their argument was 
that this tax reform was a “camouflaged” transfer to the richer ACs. In the case of Galicia, it is 
not entirely clear whether they opposed this move substantively or, rather, their PP’s controlled 
Xunta (autonomic government, in Galician) opposed it purely due to partisan calculations. 
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 government in order to approach the level of the Basques and the Catalans. Meanwhile, the latter 
governments try to maintain a distance from the rest of the communities in order to enhance their 
own difference. This game, usually known as ‘comparative grievance’, has produced more 
regional competition and much higher levels of  decentralization of the Spanish state than was 
expected before the constitutional compromise was implemented”96
 
Despite the sweeping opposition of three ACs with poor revenue-generating capacity (i.e. 
Andalusia, Castille La Mancha, and Extremadura), the tax autonomy of the regional 
governments was built up and a new financing system was agreed upon, leading to a 
reassignment of tax powers. Until the mid-90s, there were several tax assignments (wealth, 
gambling, stamp, etc.) whose yield was ceded to ACs, but no significant decision-making powers 
were at play. In turn, the power to regulate tax brackets, tax rates, and some other benefits were 
conferred on the ACs. Subsequently, the central government and the ACs agreed to broaden the 
scope of the ceded taxes and the 15 percent share of ACs on income tax was increased to a 33 
percent (Ruiz Almendral 2003). What began as a central government’s move to quench 
Catalonia’s aspirations of self-determination and autonomy, it soon turned into an “inductive 
allocation of powers” (Moreno in Agranoff and Ramos Gallarín 1997: 38) whereby all regions 
had both incentives and multiple opportunities to expand their fiscal policymaking authority. 
Uneasy as these development appeared at first to economically-backward and ostensibly looser 
ACs, it nevertheless became more difficult for them to sabotage the pace of change.  
 
                                                 
96   This amounts to something of a “bitter pill” for Catalonia and its quest for regional 
distinctiveness (Personal communication with a Consejero (Senior Advisor), Banco de España, 
February 5, 2002. 
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 These new developments and constraints notwithstanding, the jury is still out to determine what 
ACs succeeded in attracting a larger share of federal transfers. To respond this question, we 
investigate the distribution of SG and CI transfers among ACs in 1994. Echoing our analysis of 
the Argentine case, revenue/expenditure flexibility will be our approach to uncover the extent of 
peripheralization in the distribution of transfers and our main independent variable. Unlike 
Argentina, however, the time-series analysis in Spain does not provide robust evidence of a 
negative relationship between transfer dependency and grants allocations; let alone that the “all 
for one and one for all” dynamics portrayed above does not bode any significant maneuvering 
space for transfer-dependent ACs to increase their shares beyond reasonable levels. Therefore, 
we do not expect revenue/expenditure flexibility to be a major determinant in the cross-sectional 
analysis. Further, the equation to estimate this model will include all the statistically-significant 
variables in the pooled time-series analysis, which will function as control variables.97
 
Thus we estimate the following models: 
 
Subvenciones Gestionadas= B0 + b1Population + b2Unemployment + b3 Revenue/Expenditure 
Flexibility + b4Divided Government + b5Regionalist Party Presidency + e 
Convenios de Inversion= Bo + b1 Population + b2 Revenue/Expenditure Flexibility +  
b3 Regionalist Party Presidency + e 
 
 
                                                 
97   Unlike in Argentina’s analysis, we include geographical GDP because its Pearson correlation 
with the revenue/expenditure factor is not statistically significant. 
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 Table 10: THE DETERMINANTS OF SUBVENCIONES GESTIONADAS: RESULTS OF CROSS-
SECTION ANALYSIS 
Independent Variables   Coefficient   t 
Intercept       0.899    .565 
Population                  1.474**            2.341 
Geographical GDP      -.549             -.946 
Unemployment                                                 -.150             -.736 
Revenue/Expenditure Flexibility    -.061             -.338 
Divided Government      -.072             -.380 
Regionalist Party Presidency      .124    .623 
** Significant at the 0.04 level (2-tailed test) 
Note: N = 17. The dependent variable is the evolution of SG transfers to ACs in 1994. 
R2 = 0.78. Entries are standardized coefficients. 
 
Table 11: THE DETERMINANTS OF CONVENIOS DE INVERSION: RESULTS OF CROSS-SECTION 
ANALYSIS 
Independent Variables   Coefficient   t 
Intercept        .687              -.168 
Population        .877**             6.555 
Revenue/Expenditure Flexibility    -.013               -.093 
Regionalist Party System     -.009              -.066 
** Significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed test) 
Note: N = 17. The dependent variable is the evolution of CI transfers to ACs in 1994. 
R2 = 0.76. Entries are standardized coefficients 
 
 
Table 3 and 4 display the results for the SG and CI models, respectively.  First, our variable of 
interest, revenue/expenditure flexibility, is not significant, thus transfer- dependent ACs 
unwilling to shoulder the political burden of having to raise taxes locally are not rewarded. 
Charts 1 and 2 illustrate clearly the lack of a well-defined distribution of ACs when these are 
plotted over the respective federal transfers and the revenue/expenditure flexibility axes. Note 
that the only significant variable is population, and because it has positive sign there is little 
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 room to infer any important effect of political or fiscal imbalances factors. This suggests that 
when we control for these influences, population is the most important predictor of the inter-
regional distribution of intergovernmental transfers, as transpires from our data. Considering that 
population is usually included to capture any scale economies in the provision of publicly 
supplied goods and services, our finding points to the preeminence of socio-demographic 
imperatives in the inter-AC distribution of transfers.98
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBVENCIONES GESTIONADAS AND AC TRANSFER 
DEPENDENCE  
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98   To corroborate whether these results hold when the number of observations is increased, we 
used the same method applied to the analysis of the Argentine case in Chapter 3 (see footnote 35 
for full explanation of method). The sign and significance of variables remained unchanged after 
this simulation. 
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 Figure 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONVENIOS DE INVERSION AND AC TRANSFER 
DEPENDENCE  
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In order to gain a more nuanced insight into the determinants of peripheralization of inter-AC 
transfer allocation, Charts 1 and 2 display a somewhat similar spatial distribution in both transfer 
programs. Beyond the limited explanatory power of the revenue/expenditure flexibility variable, 
it appears that Catalonia has benefited most. It is also noticeable that Andalusia has performed 
consistently high in both programs and Madrid did well in one of them. Despite the fact that 
Andalusia and Madrid have relatively similar shares of total national population to that of 
Catalonia99, the latter has been disproportionately blessed by the central government’s need of 
votes in the national parliament. The above-described pivotal position of CiU, beginning in 1993 
but remaining as an enduring fact in Spain’s electoral landscape throughout the 1990s (Pallarès 
1999), and its steady hegemony in its respective regional government have undoubtedly been at 
                                                 
99   The average values for the 1990s are as follows: Andalusia with about 18, Madrid with 13, 
and Catalonia with 16 percent, respectively (Fundación BBV 1999). 
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 play. Catalonia’s pole position in the above charts is matched by parallel accomplishments such 
as control over new competences within its territory, including ports and traffic control, police 
and jail system, tax breaks for small business, authority over EU funds in their jurisdiction, and 
assumption of the Catalan AC deficits in health care delivery. In addition to these new 
competences and bail outs, Montero (2001: 159) claims that “using the distribution of spending 
on ‘reindustrialization’ policies to forge its parliamentary alliance with the Catalonians, the 
PSOE granted Pujol (Catalonia’s perennial regional leader and President, note in parentheses is 
not in original) an array of new resources and authority. Spending on projects in Catalonia 
jumped from an average of 12 percent in the 1991-94 period to 48 percent, while Madrid’s share 
fell from 62 to 34 percent. No other region’s share exceeded 4.5 percent, and most suffered 
declines”. The list of benefits continues, including support for ailing industries such subsidizing 
the state-run SEAT-Volkswagen factory in Barcelona, a city with a very high concentration of 
blue-collar workers who were crucial for PSOE’s electoral fate. When the PP took power in 
1996, Catalonia kept accruing additional “trophies” such as authority transfer to land use, 
autonomic representation in Spanish delegations to the EU and others. This suggests that while 
population shares loom large as an important factor, patronage politics played a significant role 
in the distribution of federal transfers.  
 
Nonetheless, Catalonia’s comparative advantages should be understood as part of the uneven 
territorial nature of the politics of fiscal decentralization in Spain. White it is tempting to portray 
said advantages as an archetypal case of pork-barreling distribution and coalition politics, it is 
important to bear in mind that the patchwork of subnational policy regimes in Spain is becoming 
more uniform in those areas of fiscal policy where “front-runners” like Catalonia, and the 
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 Basque Country in some respects, have shown a greater ability to increase authority within their 
own regions and greater ability to use own tax revenues at the margin. This explains why other 
ACs like Canary Islands and Valencia pursued lobby pressure on the central government to catch 
up with Basques, Navarese and Catalan achievements and why laggards such as Extremadura, 
Castille La Mancha, and, to a lesser extent, Andalusia proved unable to boycott  increasing inter-
AC cooperation in the area of fiscal federalism. Borrowing from Hall (1992), Spain’s open-
ended institutional federal structure and its concomitant periodic bargaining over competences 
facilitated policy learning among regional elites and a subsequent “paradigm shift” from 
financial autonomy (i.e. regional spending power) to fiscal autonomy (i.e. regional revenue-
generating powers).100 Put differently, Spain gradually moved from “consumption” to “market-
preserving” federalism.  
 
Moreover, Catalonia’s CiU is perhaps the most pragmatically-oriented regionalist party in Spain. 
Lying somewhere between a “catch-all” and “pressure group” strategic stance, the CiU has paid 
lip service to Catalans’ quest for an independent state but its main approach has been to resort to 
nationalism as its defining element (Marcet 1994). However, far from advocating an organic 
conception of nationalism, CiU has resorted to Catalanismo in a mostly populist fashion and as 
an electoral identifying badge. This is corroborated by evidence drawn from the Manifesto 
Research Group data, which shows that the CiU is more likely to cooperate with either the PSOE 
or the PP than other regionalist parties (Heller 2002: 664). Accordingly, CiU has been able to 
affect national policy to a larger extent than competitor regionalist forces. However, the policy 
                                                 
100   While other authors who drew on the policy learning approach have stressed the effect of the 
South European neighbors (Rico 1996) or Europeanization (Borzel 2002) on Spain’s regional 
decentralization, we focus on the domestic level influences. 
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 learning effect may have been at play in partisan politics as well, because, except for the Basque 
regionalists, most other regionalist parties have articulated a more pragmatic outlook and thus 
contribute to political integration in a decentralized state (Pallarès, Montero and Llera 1997: 
167).101 A more latent yet crucial development has been the acceptance of regionalist parties as 
important actors not only at the legislative level but also as decisive players in joint policy-
making bodies such as the CPFF, regular meetings of the national and autonomous education 
ministers, and the Intergovernmental Council on Health Matters. The institutionalization of 
regular interactions between national and regionalist parties’ leaders has led the latter to accept 
multilateral cooperation. In other words, while regionalist parties still remain “second-order” 
political forces at the legislative level, they nonetheless discovered informal means to pool their 
strategic resources. This development will take the center stage in Chapter 5, where we will 
show how the weaknesses of territorial legislative representation have shifted the locus of 
regionalist parties’ action from the senate to the above-mentioned joint co-operative bodies. 
 
Summary 
In Spain, the political determination of transfers appears also to be associated to the extent of 
peripheralization of the inter-provincial distribution of funds. Unlike Argentina, partisan 
influences are conspicuous in more informal institutional settings, as a weak senate renders their 
influence more redundant in legislative politics. Adding to this, transfer-dependent, peripheral 
ACs are not as successful as their Argentine counterparts in attracting a lion share of federal 
                                                 
101    Gibbons (1999: 26) claims that “in terms of their broad strategies, regional and nationalist 
parties have tended, to some extent, to copy each other. This was illustrated during the Second 
Republic as, one after another, the historic nationalities sought autonomous status…’autonomy 
fever’ spread across the land-mass of Spain in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when regional 
consciousness even surfaced in areas of Spain such as Extremadura and Murcia, not known 
previously to have had any special claims to regional separateness”. 
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 transfers beyond fiscal and socio-demographic considerations. The increasing accommodation of 
regionalist parties’ interests in joint decision-making bodies, where inchoate notions of fiscal 
accountability are gradually gaining more favor than economic rent-seeking, hinders the ability 
of economically disadvantaged yet politically relevant ACs to form fiscally-regressive 
distributional coalitions. In terms of our explanatory typology, Spain is then closer to the 
collaborative type of fiscal decentralization, because the level of peripheralization in the inter-
AC distribution of transfers is lower than in Argentina, yet partisan factors are still relevant and 
noticeable in the determination of grants. Accordingly, we argue that the strong presence of 
regionalist parties in mostly economically prosperous ACs has played an important role in 
preventing “over-fishing” of intergovernmental transfers by poorer ACs.   
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6 Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications 
This concluding chapter undertakes tow tasks. First, its starting point is a brief summary of the 
dissertation’s major findings. It begins by arguing that the findings challenge dominant 
approaches in the field of fiscal federalism, which see national government as benevolent 
planners and subnational governments as entities promoting interregional fiscal competition. 
Rather, we found that the political framework in which decentralization occurs is an endogenous 
influence that accounts for cross-national and cross-state variation in fiscal decentralization 
policy outputs. The second objective is to highlight the counter-intuitive nature of some of said 
findings, puts them in the context of broader discussions in comparative politics and it finally 
addresses issues related to future research in decentralization. 
 
This dissertation has made the case that a good part of the fate of fiscal decentralization policies 
stem from tension between the territorial distribution of political resources and the territorial 
distribution of economic structure. Interregional economic asymmetries, which manifest 
themselves in the degree of transfer-dependency of subnational governments, intertwine with 
political asymmetries derived from legislative overrepresentation of territorial units and 
intergovernmental bargaining strategies. That is, poorly populated, mostly economically 
disadvantaged and thus transfer-dependent regions, which are less likely to engender regionalist 
party representation, can bring into play their political overrepresentation to shield themselves 
from unwanted reforms to increase their fiscal autonomy. In this institutional environment, richer 
regions are unable to spur inter-regional cooperation to deepen decentralization because poor 
jurisdictions are more fiscally vulnerable to the national center’s attempts to negotiate bilaterally. 
On the other hand, when legislative overrepresentation is less pervasive, economically powerful 
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 and thus self-financing regions, where regionalist party dominance is more widespread, exert 
pressure to deepen fiscal decentralization and co-responsibility. In this milieu, richer regions are 
more capable to obstruct poorer regions’ attempts to interfere with fiscal decentralization and 
horizontal, multilateral negotiations are increasingly advanced.  
 
The effect of said regional power asymmetries on the allocation of revenue and revenue authority 
is mediated by three major influences: the entrenchment of regionalist party-dominant systems, 
levels of overrepresentation and policy scope of the senate, and the ability of subnational 
governments to develop horizontal cooperation in bargaining with central government officials. 
In Argentina, where regionalist political forces are coopted by mainstream political parties, 
territorial representation takes place in an overrepresented and policy-powerful senate, and the 
national gov’t negotiates bilaterally with provincial administrations, transfer-dependent, 
peripheral provinces, reluctant to deepen revenue decentralization, become king-makers and 
fiscal decentralization is hindered. In contrast, the Spanish case shows that, when regionalist 
forces, mostly controlling richer ACs, are vibrant, the Senate is a relatively policy-impotent and 
not extremely overrepresented institution, and ACs are increasingly involved in horizontal 
collaboration to negotiate multilaterally with Madrid, transfer-self sufficient ACs play a king-
maker role and revenue decentralization is gradually advanced. This theoretical framework 
therefore allows us to show that countries such as Argentina and Spain, which initiated processes 
of fiscal decentralization with similar structural conditions insofar as their respective regional 
governments have significant expenditure responsibilities and low level of revenue authority, can 
attain different levels of revenue decentralization over time. 
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 It is noteworthy that the same institutional problems that preclude the advancement of fiscal 
decentralization are also associated with national fiscal crises. Argentina, a country whose 
policies of economic adjustment in the early 1990s have won it international acclaim,  has 
proved unable to restructure its federal system to address severe imbalances in the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The overall unsustainable level of subnational debt and the 
limiting authority of the center to rein in fiscal discipline lurked underneath Argentina’s foreign 
debt default - the world’s largest – and the premature fall of De La Rua’s elected government in 
December 2001. Federalism and its concomitant institutional protection of the autonomy of 
subnational units can at times have perverse effects on macroeconomic performance. Despite 
federalism’s ostensible “market-preserving” quality, deadlocked and malfunctioning federal 
institutions can lead to economic catastrophes. 
 
These findings rejoin the existing literature on federalism and decentralization, while at the same 
time highlighting more unforeseen and counter-intuitive aspects of the subject theme and thus 
providing more precise insights. For example, coalition-building goals drive presidents in 
Argentina to reach out legislators of the opposition by means of allocating larger shares of 
federal transfers to the provinces the latter belong to. This strategy is intelligible insofar as 
presidents, who count on copartisan legislators’ support due to relatively high levels of party 
discipline, seek to extend the scope of their policy coalitions in congress. However, favoring 
opposition forces over copartisan forces may have the unexpected effect of damaging partisan 
interests because targeting greater transfers to opposition bulwarks bolster their political bases 
and their capacity to more effectively challenge the ruling party in future elections. This finding 
thus suggests that short-term policy coalition-building goals may hurt mid and long-term partisan 
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 interests. At the same time, this conclusion indicates that an alternative model of “rationality” to 
address intergovernmental party concerns may be at play, in which case we need to rethink 
theories of party systems in multitiered systems. 102
 
Similarly, this study shows that the presence of formal governmental structures to represent 
territorial interests does not necessarily mean they are effective in practice. A highly 
“institutionalized” senate in Argentina shields the political and economic interests of poorly-
developed, yet politically powerful, provinces. As these provinces are coopted in the legislative 
process at a more “convenient” price than metropolitan regions, regional asymmetries in the 
allocation of revenue and revenue authority are sustained over time. A far less “institutionalized” 
chamber of territorial representation and a more malleable and open-ended institutional 
configuration in Spain prevents backward regions to exploit institutional devices to block fiscal 
decentralization. What is more, this institutional malleability has facilitated the emergence of 
alternative policy-making mechanisms where multilateral subnational coordination is facilitated 
and fiscal decentralization further expanded. Therefore, formal federal polities, which are 
normally based on strong bicameralism, can at times be less effective than more loose, yet 
decentralizing unitary systems in deepening fiscal decentralization. This finding complicates the 
validity of held views about the positive association between political federalism and fiscal 
decentralization. 
 
In focusing on the tension between the territorial distribution of political resources and the 
territorial distribution of economic structure, another implication also poses daunting challenges 
                                                 
102  I am grateful to William Keech for reminding me of this possibility. 
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 to the fiscal federalism scholarship. This tension exacerbates the politicization of  
intergovernmental fiscal relations and, what is more, it becomes palpable in the mutually-
reinforcing relationship between decentralization and regionalized patronage. While the 
conventional wisdom in the subject that sees distributive politics as a mere residual issue, namely 
that it plays no role in the determination of fiscal decentralization reforms or, ever worse, that 
patronage is doomed to wither away once fiscal decentralization evolves, exactly the contrary is 
argued in this study. The policy of transferring revenue and revenue authority to subnational 
governments not only renders possible the entrenchment of patronage-ridden regional enclaves 
but, also, the latter can exploit institutional and political opportunities to sabotage fiscal 
decentralization projects. 
 
More broadly, this dissertation indicates a new direction for research in comparative politics. 
Despite the obvious hindrances for conducting cross-regional studies, subnational-level analysis 
is an effective antidote because it allows to comparing cross-national units while holding the 
national political culture and regional context constant. Observers of decentralization have 
developed a rich literature in their efforts to account for reforms that eliminate fiscal policy 
distortions but these works come from isolated research on a handful of countries that are 
analyzed individually. To the degree that subnational governments are responsible for significant 
portions of total public spending (and, as we sought to illustrate in this study, in charge of 
increasing revenue authorities), research in comparative federalism must include comparison of 
subnational-level units. Further, and without denying the potential confounding effect of regional 
contexts, important lessons can be drawn from analyzing countries such as Brazil and Germany, 
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 whose respective subnational governments face similar incentives to overuse national revenue 
and institutional rules of the game comparable to those of Argentina and Spain.  
 
In closing, this study provides useful insights to map out the trajectory of fiscal decentralization 
changes, highlighting the role of territorially-based policy coalitions and inter-state level conflict. 
It does not, however, solve all heretofore unmeasured aspects of fiscal decentralization, or 
decentralization more generally, nor does it tell the reader whether Argentina is more or less 
“decentralized” than Spain. Important as these questions may be, it remains for future research 
efforts to refine some empirical and econometric dimensions of the analysis. My hope is that the 
issues raised in this study will serve as a useful starting point for more systematic efforts to 
understand the political roots of subnational fiscal politics. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A Conceptual Clarification of Intergovernmental Jurisdictions and Terminology 
 
In this dissertation, we assume that intergovernmental relations develop on a two-tier basis: The 
central government and the second-tier constituent units. This means that the tier-level political 
units, commonly identified as “local government”, “municipality”, “county” and the like are not 
included in the analysis. In Daniel Elazar’s words, “in most federal systems, the essential bargain 
is between a general government and state governments or their equivalents” (Elazar 1987: 187). 
Considering that the intergovernmental transfers analyzed in this study are allocated to second-
tier authorities, which subsequently and by mean of different formula channel funds to the local 
level, we focus on the relationship between the first two tiers. When we refer to the central 
government, we will use this term with the following tantamount expressions: national 
government, federal government, and center. 
Given the wide variety of federal system, it should not be surprising that there different terns are 
used to name the second-tier, subnational levels. As follows, we provide a list of “functional 
equivalents” and their national origin: 
Autonomous Communities: Spain 
Emirates: United Arab Emirates 
Provinces: Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, South Africa, Yugoslavia 
States: Australia, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nigeria, Unites States, 
Venezuela 
Länder: Austria, Germany 
Cantons: Switzerland 
Regions: Belgium 
Republics: Russian Federation 
State-Members: European Union (?) 
Islands: Comoro Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Data and Sources 
 
Variables      Source 
 
Dependent 
FONAVI      MECON, Ejecución Presupuestaria FEDEI  
       MECON, Ejecución Presupuestaria 
ATN       MECON, Ejecución Presupuestaria 
Subvenciones Gestionadas    Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
Convenios de Inversión    Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
 
Independent
Population (Argentina)    INDEC, Censo 
Population (Spain)     INE, Encuesta de Población Activa  
Unemployment (Argentina)    INDEC, Anuario Estadístico 
Unemployment (Spain)    INE 
Geographical GDP (Argentina)   Elías (1996) 
Geographical GDP (Spain)    BBV  
House Building  INDEC, Edificación  
Divided Government (Argentina) Fraga (1995), Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 
(1999) 
Divided Government (Spain). Anuario El País 
Partisan Disharmony (Argentina) Fraga (1995), Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 
(1999) 
Partisan Disharmony (Spain) Anuario El País 
Provincial Party Governor Fraga (1995), Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 
(1999) 
Regionalist Party President Anuario El País 
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